THE ROLE OF HISTORY AND CULTURE IN DEVELOPING
BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS: THE PERILS OF
LEGAL TRANSPLANTATION
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I. INTRODUCTION.
Does culture shape law or does law shape culture? Throughout history, culture
has taken the leading role by informing society of what laws are necessary and
appropriate.1 Today, however, global economics are rapidly changing the world, and
credit - particularly consumer credit - is being offer in greater amounts and to greater
numbers of people in more countries than ever before.2 Commercial borrowing is also on
the rise. One question raised by these increases in debt is whether there will be sufficient
safety nets in place to help people and entities that are unable to pay back all this new
debt.
Many governments with developing economies are aware of the need for more
forgiving insolvency systems, and are implementing such systems.3 In most cases,
however, these new proposed systems do not arise from existing cultural conditions.
Rather, the laws are transplanted from elsewhere and the cultural views are expected to
change with the laws. Many new bankruptcy laws have been transplanted from the U.S.,
which has a very different cultural attitude toward debt forgiveness.4 Although these
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Blackness, 70 IND. L. J. 709, 713-14 (1995) (discussing generally how culture informs law and economics
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Certre for Economic Modeling, School of Economics, University of Nottingham), at 1,
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visited on March 2, 2003 (noting tremendous increases in credit card debt in Europe); Ian Fletcher, Card
Fraud Soars to Pounds 228M, EVENING STANDARD, Oct. 16, 2002, 2002 WL 101323704 (noting mounting
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3
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4
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Experience, 21 CAL. BANKR. J.153, 153 (1993) (noting how other countries are looking to the U.S. for an
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imported systems have been strangely out of place in other societies, the transplantation
continues.5 This Article raises the question of whether these attempts at transplantation
are likely to create the desired results of fueling a market economy and promoting
economic growth and well-being.
The current American bankruptcy system grew directly out of the U.S.’s unique
capitalist system, 6 which rewards entrepreneurialism as well as extensive consumer
spending.7 It makes sense that a society in which dollars rule would have a forgiving
personal bankruptcy system in order to keep consumer spending high,8 and an equally
forgiving business reorganization system to encourage risk taking and economic growth.9
Both systems are part of a larger scheme to keep economic players alive and active in the
game of capitalism. American bankruptcy systems are among the country’s few social
programs and address many of society’s ills.10 Thus, they are broad and form an integral
part of the social system from which they sprung.11
As globalization takes place, more and more countries believe that creating a
viable bankruptcy system will help fuel a market economy.12 As a result, many countries
have attempted to create a Chapter 11-style reorganization scheme for failing enterprises,
in which existing management stays in place and manages the reorganizing company.13
England, are looking to Article 9 of the American Uniform Commercial Code to solve a few nagging
problems with personal property security systems in their own countries’ laws).
5
See infra notes 409-37 and 482-511and accompanying text.
6
As one American scholar recently noted:
[E]ach country gets the bankruptcy law it deserves. I think we deserve chapter 11. Bankruptcy
does not exist independent of the social system that exists in each nation. The United States has
little in the way of government sponsored programs to compensate people for the dislocation
caused by financial failure. So every financial problem, and that is not hyperbole, I think that’s
almost true, every consequence of every financial problem is thrown into our bankruptcy system:
environmental problems, mass tort problems, business failure problems, failure of companies
properly to fund their retirement plans. Whatever the reason for financial failure, the only place
we have to put it is bankruptcy.
Richard F. Broude, et.al., The Judge’s Role in Insolvency Proceedings: Views From the Bench: Views
from the Bar, 10 AMER. BANKR. INST. L.REV. 511, 522 (2002) (comments of Richard Broude) (hereinafter,
“Views from the Bench”).
7
Spending is critical to the U.S. economy, as President Bush reminded us after 9/11. Frequent admonitions
to spend caused one author to call this the “shop-till Osama-drops” plan for fighting terrorism. See Alan
Reder, The Yoga of Money, YOGA JOURNAL, March-April 2003, at 114.
8
“When will we Spend Again?,” October 26, 2001, www.cnn.com, visited on January 7, 2003.
9
See infra notes 157-198 and accompanying text.
10
See supra note 6; see also KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY
SYSTEM 93-98 (1997)(describing the incredible emotional benefits of bankruptcy, which in turn benefit the
economy as well as the persons well being).
11
In the United States, we do not draw large distinctions between our forgiving “rescue” culture for
businesses on the one hand, and for individuals on the other. Philosophically, every person is a potential
entrepreneur. See EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, NAVIGATING FAILURE: BANKRUPTCY AND COMMERCIAL
SOCIETY IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 28 (N. Carolina Press 2001).
12
The International Monetary Fund certainly believes this and made creation of a reorganization system for
failing businesses a prerequisite to bail-out assistance during the Asian crisis. See Thailand Letter of Intent,
dated August 25, 1998, http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/082598.htm, visited on March 26, 2003.
13
The rationale is that providing for rescue opportunities creates additional benefits to society not available
in a liquidation only system, such as greater return for unsecured creditors, an ability for equity holders to
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These systems are perhaps the most common American legal export today.14 Many
countries are also liberalizing their consumer bankruptcy systems.15 Because consumer
credit has become much more available in Western Europe and Japan, as well as parts of
the developing world, more forgiving bankruptcy systems are a necessity.16 They cannot
be imported wholesale, however.
Insolvency systems profoundly reflect the legal, historical, political, and cultural
context of the countries that have developed them. Thus, even countries that share a
common legal tradition, such as the United States, England, Canada, and Australia,
display marked differences in how they approach both business and personal
bankruptcies.17 Countries with different legal traditions, such as those within Continental
Europe and Japan, currently have even more divergent bankruptcy systems, though many
are moving toward the U.S. models.18
Given the vast cultural differences around the world, and the history of each
country’s economy and attitudes about money and debt, there is no one-kind-fits-all
bankruptcy system for either enterprises or individuals.19 New insolvency systems must
instead reflect how individual nations have experienced the growth of market economies,
and how, philosophically, countries have viewed debt. Bankruptcy systems are social
tools. As such, they are value-laden and must be drafted with care to reflect the particular
values of a culture. Yet the extensive availability of credit requires a face-saving way out
of financial failure. Providing such a way out is a challenge many nations will face as
credit is used more extensively in the new modern economy. This Article attempts to aid
this transition in some small way, by helping inform the decisions made within
developing systems.
Part II of this Article explains the symbiotic relationship between capitalism and
bankruptcy laws, the theories behind these laws, and the history and political systems
retain an interest in a viable company, saving jobs, allowing suppliers to survive and allowing customers to
continue receiving goods and services that may be in short supply. See Jeffrey Davis, Bankruptcy,
Banking, Free Trade, and Canada’s Refusal to Modernize its Business Reorganization Laws, 26 TEX. L.
REV. L. J. 253, 253 (1991). Liquidation, conversely, can cause a domino of failure, unnecessarily harming
everyone whom the debtor does business. See id.
14
Metzger & Bufford, supra note 4, at 154. Initiatives to replicate at least some of the properties of
Chapter 11 can be seen in Japan, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, China, the former Soviet Union, and
Mexico, among other places. See id
15
See Efrat, supra note 3, at 92-93. Some countries, such as Italy and France, still have no personal
bankruptcy system at all. See infra notes 347-70 and accompanying text.
16
See Rafael Efrat, The Rise and Fall of Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study of Individual Bankruptcy
Petitioners in Israel, 7 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 163, 165-66. (discussing the need for a forgiving bankruptcy
systems once credit has been deregulated).
17
See Nathalie Martin, Common Law Bankruptcy Systems: Similarities and Differences, 11 AMER. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 367, 403-10 (2003).
18
See infra notes 262-302, and 375-411and accompanying text.
19
One may not simply reproduce Chapter 11, with its emphasis on the enterprise, the shareholders and the
creditors, in societies that place more value on employees and government debt than on payments to private
creditors. Nor can one expect a society that deeply values a person’s word, and his or her “honor,” to
readily accept the personal bankruptcy discharge, even if doing so would fuel an economy based on
consumer spending.
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upon which they are based.20 This section also describes modern credit practices and
attitudes toward debt and repayment.21 It then briefly describes the American bankruptcy
systems that developed out of this economic history.22
Part III discusses divergent attitudes toward debt in other parts of the world, using
England, parts of continental Europe, and parts of East Asia as examples.23 While many
of these countries and regions have imported U.S.-style bankruptcy laws to some extent,
all have far less forgiving cultural views toward debt and debt forgiveness than does the
U.S.24 Given these pronounced differences in attitude, this Section concludes that the
mere import of U.S.-style reorganization and personal debt forgiveness systems is
unlikely to create the desired economic effect.25
Part IV describes the global trend toward credit proliferation and concludes that
countries must carefully examine cultural views and attitudes before allowing credit to
spin out of control in their countries.26 If it is too late, and credit is already widely
available despite very negative stigma toward failure, this section advocates large-scale
education efforts in order to keep people from becoming indigenous, or even suicidal,
following mounting debt.27 It ultimately concludes that while importing a more
forgiving bankruptcy system may help stem these problems, without changes in cultural
attitudes, these new laws may have little impact.28
II. BANKRUPTCY IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, ATTITUDES AND LAW
This Section outlines the history of the U.S. growth economy and the unique
entrepreneurial spirit that led to an equally unique bankruptcy system for both businesses
and consumers.29 It also discusses the development of consumer and credit culture and
the laws that have developed from these unique quirks of history.30
A. The History of the American Economy: The Connection Between Bankruptcy Law
and Capitalism
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See infra notes 31-198 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 118-45 and accompanying text. This section discusses recent empirical research regarding
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See infra notes 146-98 and accompanying text.
23
See infra notes 199-510 and accompanying text.
24
See id.
25
See infra notes 507-10 and accompanying text.
26
See infra notes 511-20 and accompanying text.
27
See id.
28
See infra notes 517-20 and accompanying text.
29
See infra notes 31-65 and accompanying text. One of the goals of this section is to explain to foreign
scholars who are studying the U.S. insolvency systems, as well as to American scholars, how the American
system came into being and how it fuels U.S. capitalism and entrepreneurialism.
30
See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
21
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Relatively speaking, American society can be characterized as capitalistic and
consumeristic, although the extent to which America should embrace these two
ideologues has been controversial throughout our history.31 Early discussions of
bankruptcy policy were divisive, in part because early bankruptcy policy helped shape
our nation’s economic identity.32 The expansion of capitalism and spending resulted in
some failure, followed by the creation of our first bankruptcy system.33 This section
reviews the economic culture from which this bankruptcy system arose.34
1. The Development of America’s Free-Market Economy.
Alex de Tocqueville’s “new model man” portrayed America as a child of the
commercial revolution that should progress quickly toward commercial and industrial
maturity. 35 This model saw economic prosperity, technical development, education and
expanded cultural opportunities as the lynchpins of a successful society.36 On the other
hand, the agricultural sector of society rejected these big-business ideas as a threat to
their ideal nation of small producers and laborers who earned an honest living working
the soil.37 They saw the new merchant and financial capitalists as:
parasites who drop their buckets into wells dug by others…. Unbounded by any
connection to honest labor, their profits could accrue to such a level as to enable
the capitalist sector to upset the delicate counterpoise of interests that sustain a
free and virtuous social order, and substitute a morally vacuous dynamic of
market transactions and profit calculations that respects the social identity of
neither person nor property.38
In this context, the battle over appropriate bankruptcy laws began. The market capitalists
saw the development of a credit-based economy as absolutely essential. Conversely, the

31

See Richard C. Sauer, Bankruptcy Law and the Maturing American Capitalist, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 291,
291-97 (1994).
32
See id. at 298.
33
See id.
34
This Article does not outline the history of American bankruptcy laws, as this has been done well and
extensively by previous scholars. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy
Discharge, 65 AMER. BANKR. L.J. 325, 336 (1991)(hereinafter, “Evolution of Discharge”) ; Charles Jordan
Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AMER. BANKR. INST. L. J. 5, 7
(1995)(hereinafter, “History of Bankruptcy”).
35
See id. at 291-92.
36
See id. at 292.
37
See id. These were the Jeffersonian Republicans, who later became Democratic Republicans, and then
finally, modern-day Democrats. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION 26 (Princeton Univ. Press
2001).
38
See id. at 293. As Sauer notes, this view was not limited to purely southern agrarians. For instance,
Benjamin Franklin wrote, "the only honest Way; wherein Man receives a real Increase of the Seed thrown
into the Ground, in a kind of continual Miracle wrought by the Hand of God ... as a reward for his innocent
Life and virtuous Industry." Benjamin Franklin, Positions to Be Examined, Apr. 4, 1769, in 16 FRANKLIN
PAPERS 107, 109 (Williams Wilcox ed., 1972). Thus, the Franklin’s sentiments illustrates that upon this
nation’s formation, mercantile capitalism-with its venture capitalists-was not an idea embraced
immediately.
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agrarian sector of society saw extensive credit as a vice.39 The more a person wished to
create a free-market capitalist economy, the more he supported the free availability of
credit, as well as a systematic means of dealing with financial failure.40
By the early 1800’s capitalist interests began to win out over agrarian interests,
and a greater number of agrarians began producing food for sale rather than mere
consumption.41 Artisans in turn moved away from customized markets and toward
standardized goods for a larger market. More and more Americans entered business as
merchants of one form or another.42 Burgeoning market-oriented production and surging
demand for food and consumer goods fostered great economic growth. In the decades
following the War of 1812, Americans produced more cotton, grain, livestock, textile
goods, coal, and lumber, than previously thought possible.43 A greater number of
Americans began, at last, to have disposable income to spend on house wares, nicer
homes, fancier furnishing and clothing and unimproved land.
The expansion of America’s market economy, however, depended heavily upon
“the credit system”- an intricate tangle of obligations that extended throughout the
country’s financing production, distribution, and consumption.44 America saw itself as a
land of great potential, and was thus taken by optimism and a willingness to build and
spend far beyond its actual wealth.45 Thus, the antebellum economy was structured as
much around borrowed money and promises to pay as it was around rivers, roads and
canals.46
Few merchants could enter business without credit.47 Entrepreneurs rarely paid
rent, wages, supplies, or transportation costs in advance, nor did they demand cash from
their own customers.48 A study of the court records of debtors who filed for bankruptcy
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 showed that the use of credit was common by the mid1800s.49 Thus, by the mid-1800s, many merchants not only paid debts many months after
39

See id. at 294-95. These were the Federalists, who later became the Whigs, who then became modernday Republicans. See Skeel, supra note 37, at 26.
40
See id. Much of this view was predicated on the intangibility of credit. That is, as a primarily agrarian
economy, where trade and commerce existed as a real exchange of goods, credit allowed one party to the
transaction to “cheat” by receiving something for nothing. In a sense, the idea of credit as a vice to these
agrarians makes perfect sense as their timeframe within each commercial transaction was as limited as the
perishability of the items they sold. Thus, selling on credit a perishable item that could never be
repossessed likely influenced this view.
41
See BALLEISEN, supra note 11, at 26.
42
See id. at 26-27.
43
See id.
44
See id. at 27.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 27-28.
47
See id. at 26. As Balleisen notes, this dependence on credit was based in part on the development of
America’s post-revolution brand of market capitalism. Id.
48
See id. at 28 (describing how merchants rarely expected to be paid upon delivery, for agricultural
products or finished articles).
49
See id. generally. Balleisen spent several years in the Northeast branch of the National Archives in
Bayonne, and later when it relocated to Manhattan, examining federal bankruptcy records following the
passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841. Balleisen found that as many as one in three businesses succumbed
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they were incurred, but also allowed their own customers to pay them under even slower
payment schedules.50 Needless to say, this does not make particular business sense, but
the free market economy was new and many wanted to participate.51
The availability of credit was seen as central to reaching economic potential in a
capitalist system.52 In fact, one scholar had called “systemized credit” the one
characteristic of capitalism that distinguishes it from all other economic orders. As the
Albany Republican Committee noted in 1837, “the credit system has extended our
commerce all over the world - peopled our wilderness - built our cities and villages founded our colleges and built our schools. It has given us national wealth and individual
prosperity.” 53 In short, credit was in large part what defined capitalism as well as
wealth.54
2. The Rationale and Political Milieu of Early American Bankruptcy Law.
While credit was seen as necessary, it also had its hazards. Where there is credit,
there is also default, and the use of credit unquestionably made early Americans
vulnerable to the shifting currents of the overall economy, and intricately tied to the
financial health of the firms with which they did business.55 This may explain why many
early market capitalists in America favored a systematic and forgiving bankruptcy system
to address the issue of default.56 Ironically, a system of distributing a debtor’s available
assets and discharging his or her remaining debts was ultimately seen as a characteristic

to filing for bankruptcy. He found that the availability of credit was far greater than many had anticipated.
One of his underlying theses is that the integration of a national credit system helped contribute to a new
phase of capitalism in America. The average American could now start up a business on credit and live the
American dream. Of course, the business cycle, economic blights, and large debt burdens forced many to
file. See id. generally.
50
See id. at 28-32.
51
See id. at 53. Balleisen quotes an article from a defunct New York magazine from the time, which read
“All classes became smitten with a sudden criminal passion of being rich…They thought no more of the
gradual accumulation of wealth by labor, but would escape the curse imposed on Adam. A fortune must
now be made in a day.” Rural tales and sketches of Long Island: The Kushow Property, THE
KNICKERBOCKER (1835) 190.
52
See Sauer, supra note 31, at 294-95 (discussing how the availability of credit has long been central to
developing a capitalist economy). See also FOREST & ELLEN SHAPIRO MCDONALD, REQUIM: VARIATIONS
ON EIGHTEENTH CENTURY THEMES 185 (1988); ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 275-77 (1937).
53
See BALLEISIEN, supra note 11, at 32. The quote comes from a July 22, 1837 article in NWR, Address of
the Albany General Republican Committee” Credit is the universal solvent of a market economy. It
increases the liquidity of assets and allows extensive investment, even from geographically remote
locations.
54
"[Credit] is a kind of mercantile funding system, which enables [merchants] to enlarge their capital by
anticipating the profits of their enterprises." 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 1098 (1822) (remarks of Rep. Wood).
55
See BALLEISEN, supra note 11, at 31.
56
See Sauer, supra note 31, at 295-96; but see supra notes 42-45. Thus, the division between agrarians and
capitalists, between bankruptcy advocates and those against it, was predicated on a recognition of the
potential for failure and the need to address such failure.
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of economic modernity, “the result of the complex development to which modern society
has attained.”57
People took risks and the bankruptcy system facilitated this risk by design. The
drive to be self-employed, and thus to be successful in business, caused a great deal of
financial failure in the mid-1800’s.58 The economy was friendly to any capitalist effort, as
the goal was to create a vibrant market economy as quickly as possible. 59 As young men
tried their luck at business, many learned about success, as well as failure in the pursuit.60
Interestingly, early bankruptcy merchants included women as well as men, indicating that
women participated in the marketplace even as early as the 1700’s.61
A legal culture of tolerance toward non-payment developed, in order to encourage
people to continue entrepreneurial pursuits.62 The relative lenience of American
bankruptcy law, as compared to law on the European Continent, for example, shocked
some, including Alex de Toqueville, who commented on the “strange indulgence” shown
to bankrupts in the American Union.63 He claimed that in this respect, “the Americans
differ, not only from the nations of Europe, but from all the commercial nations of our
time.”64

57

Id. at 296(quoting R. McLean, Bankruptcy Law, 2 LAW NOTES 292, 292 (Albert Gibson ed., 1883); see
also H.R. Rep. No. 5, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. (1841); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 755 (1866)
(remarks of Rep. Jenckes).
58
See BALLEISEN, supra note 11, at 15. The desire to go into business, despite inexperience and limited
capital, made many early entrepreneurs vulnerable to financial failure. See id.
59
See id.
60
See id. at 18.
61
See Karen Gross, Marie Stefanini Newman, and Denise Campbell, Ladies in Red: Learning from
America’s First Female Bankrupts, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 20 (1996). The stories of the women told in
this article prove that women of the 18th and 19th century were indeed engaged in the commercial
marketplace and the world of debt and credit. Some had children and some did not, and most were engaged
in business of some sort. See id. at 16-18. Like the men, some failed, but in a sense this is evidence of their
success. See id. at 36. They too were willing to take risks. See id.
62
See BALLEISEN, supra note 11, at 16.
63
See id. at 13.
64
Id. at 13. Tolerance toward bankruptcy debtors was seen as a significant contributor to successful
capitalism, as volatility in the free market was a fact of life. See id. at 18; see also Sauer, supra note 31, at
295. As during financial panics and depressions, bankruptcy helped problems percolate slowly through the
system. More importantly, endemic insolvency and the ability of bankrupts to gain legal absolution from
old debts “unleashed a range of economic energies.” As Balleisen explains:
Perhaps the most important connections between antebellum bankruptcy and the release of
capitalist energy manifested themselves in post-failure career strategies. Not every former
bankrupt sought haven from risk after insolvency. Discharge from past obligations encouraged a
number of highfliers to redouble their entrepreneurial efforts. These bankrupts typically sought to
breech prevailing commercial boundaries, either by expanding the domain of market transactions,
developing new products, or devising new methods of distribution. On occasion such efforts
produced spectacular postfailure successes; more commonly they led only to new accumulations
of unpayable obligations. Collectively, the ventures of risk-taking former bankrupts helped
consolidated a business culture predicated on “creative destruction,” in which a multitude of
entrepreneurs mounted ongoing assaults on prevailing forms of economic activity, at once seeking
profits and envisioning, if not always realizing, a continuous process of social “improvement.
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The American system also developed from the U.S.’s unique partisan political
system, the unique way that both debtor and creditor interests were balanced in the
system, and the early and prominent role of attorneys as the primary professionals in the
developing system. In his account of the role of politics in the developing U.S.
bankruptcy law, bankruptcy historian David Skeel explains that once creditor groups
formed trade organizations that promoted the passage of a federal bankruptcy law,
populist interests joined forces as well, forcing a compromise between debtor and
creditor groups not seen in England or elsewhere. Because Republicans tended to favor
creditor interests and Democrats or the populists tended to favor debtor interests, the
compromises that resulted were the product of the unique, American two-party system.
Moreover, from the start, private attorneys played a very significant role in
American bankruptcy cases and in the reform process. As the law took shape, general
practitioners began to specialize in bankruptcy cases. These attorneys perpetuated the
system. As Professor Skeel, recounts:
…government agencies have a tendency to self-perpetuate. Once Congress
establishes a new agency and creates jobs for a group of new government
officials, these same officials will later serve as the primary bulwark against
elimination of the agency. In a sense, the agency becomes its own political
constituency.65
As Professor Skeel explains, while the bankruptcy bar is private rather than
governmentally-run, it has played an analogous, self-perpetuating role. This is one
explanation for why the system changes, but never by leaps and bounds.
BALLEISEN, supra note 11, at 19. A lenience toward debtors helped ordinary people create a market
economy in the United States, and also caused some to rethink their role in the capitalist economy and thus
to engage in valuable “capitalist adaptation.” Id. at 21.
Thus, bankruptcy’s historical popularity with the commercial classes is attributable to its ability to
promote and foster commercial development in several ways. First, having an involuntary bankruptcy
system in place makes it more efficient to collect and distribute assets and also serves a deterrent function
of causing people to pay debts rather than lose assets. See Sauer, supra note 31, at 299. Both involuntary
and voluntary bankruptcy save the costs of fighting among creditors and prevents state law collection
efforts from eviscerating the debtor’s estate before it can be efficiently distributed. Preference laws, which
require that creditors who received advantageous payments or property just prior to a bankruptcy to return
it, discourage creditors from trying to gain such advantage while a debtor is insolvent. See id. Finally, by
allowing a debtor to discharge most debts as long as he or she is honest and cooperative, the debtor has
every incentive to be honest and helpful and not hide assets. See id.
Other more obvious financial benefits flow from a well-developed bankruptcy system as well. By
limiting the financial exposure of individuals, risk-taking is encouraged and the economy can grow. See id.
at 301. Finally, and perhaps most obviously, by allowing an individual to discharge debts that are a burden,
he or she can return to economic life, hire employees or be an employee, pay taxes, buy things, and
otherwise fuel the economy. Such a system can keep that person “in play”, rather than leaving them
economically dormant, imprisoned, and with a family supported by the state.
This Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the precursor to our current system and the first systematic
bankruptcy system of the nation. Id. The history surrounding its enactment explains in some measure how
our complex bankruptcy system developed so much earlier than all other systems of its kind around the
world. Id.
65
Skeel, supra note 37, at 90.
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Thus, a number of unique characteristics have created the United States’ unique
bankruptcy system. These characteristics include a strong societal desire to create a
commercial economy, a resulting extensive use of credit, a desire to balance creditor and
debtor interests in developing the law, a unique two-party political system that helped
create this balance, as well as a highly unusual and prominent role for private attorneys in
the bankruptcy process.
3. The Rise in American Consumerism.
The above discussion focuses primarily on the development of business and
commerce and the resulting business debt. Our current attitudes toward “personal” or
“consumer” bankruptcy, on the other hand, developed far more recently, under
circumstances no less unique. The United States was pulled out of the great depression by
World War II, which created jobs for virtually everyone who was not in the Armed
forces.66 Due to rationing of most consumer products, and stopped production for others,
most people saved their wages.67 After the war, we experienced a period of inflation,
after which consumer demand for various household goods and services increased
dramatically.68 Three things fueled these increases in demand, a pent-up desire for things
that were unavailable during the war, large savings accounts, and the baby boom.69
American policy at the time promoted spending to the fullest extent possible. As
one consultant announced shortly after the war,” the greatest challenge facing American
business was convincing consumers that the hedonistic approach to life is a moral, not an
immoral one.”70 This strategy apparently worked well, as Americans began purchasing
to be happy, and building social experiences around the act of acquiring.71
As inflation subsided, the housing and auto industries expanded and America
began exporting a huge variety of goods, including farm products. This resulted in large
trade surpluses since Europe and Japan, our main trade partners, had little to export.72
The economy grew strongly and stably in the early 1950s.73 Capital was plentiful, and
consumer goods appeared everywhere in record numbers. Chains like Sears and
Montgomery Ward sold products cheaply and more and more household electronic goods
were being manufactured.74

66

See John Henry Schlaegel, Law and Economic Change in the Short Twentieth Century, draft manuscript,
on file with author.
67
See id. at 3, 8.
68
See id. at 8.
69
See. id.
70
David Ray Papke, Discharge as Denouement: Appreciating the Storytelling of Appellate Opinions, in
NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE 206, 214 (ed. Papke 1991).
71
See id.
72
See Schlaegel, supra note 66, at 9.
73
See id. at 9.
74
See id. at 3-4.
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Americans with ready cash on hand began to believe that they needed these
gadgets, that they were a sign of modernity and prosperity, and that buying them would
fuel the economy. Thus, a consumer class was born.
Since that time, though the U.S. economy has sagged at various times, U.S. wages
have made domestic production uncompetitive in many industries and thus upset trade
balances.75 Wealth per household actually decreased, yet consumer spending did not
dissipate.76 Instead, it has increased as consumer credit has been made available in
record amounts to people of lower and lower economic means.77 Over time we have
learned to consume too well. While we can manufacture and produce many products and
services worthy of export, our voracious desire to consume makes it unlikely that we will
ever produce as much as we use.78 As a culture, we love to spend, and are even
encouraged to do so when the economy flags, despite record household credit and record
low savings rates.
4. The Effect of Low Down-Payment Home Loans on Consumer Spending
Habits.
Another historical event that drastically changed the debtor-creditor system in the
United States was the home ownership program introduced by President Roosevelt in the
New Deal Legislation.79 Before 1930, home loans had short terms and were used
primarily by the wealthy, because one was required to put down 50% of the purchase
price in order to get a home loan. As a result of these conditions, only about 45% of the
homes in American were owner occupied.80 Roosevelt sought to foster stability and

75

Low-skill labor wages in the U.S. are much higher than similar skill labor wages elsewhere. In these
cases, firms have a clear incentive to move abroad those operations which utilize low-skill labor.
Slaughter, Matthew J., Multinational Firms and Wages in a Global Economy, www.dartmouth.edu/`glm,
visited on January 6, 2003.
76
Id.
77
See Credit Screening: The Rest of the Story, 49 CON L. QUARTERLY 391 (Fall 1995); see also THERESA
SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN AND JAY WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS 135 (Yale University
Press 2000)(hereafter, “FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS”). In 1910, Sears began selling goods on credit to ordinary
working class people. In 1949, the Diners Club card was Fragileborn, so executives could keep track of
charges and pay just one bill per month. See id. at 109. In 1958, American express and Carte Blanche
joined and in the 1960’s MasterCard and Visa set up their extensive credit card networks. In 1986, Sears
entered the all-purpose card market with its Discover Card. By the end of the 1990’s, Americans carried
over $500 billion in outstanding credit card debt. See id.
The next historical event of significance was the deregulation of consumer interest rates, which
made credit card lending the more profitable than any other aspect of lending, and also made it profitable to
lend to higher credit risks. See id. at 135.
78
Statistics from the Bureau of Economic Analysis show that over the past few years, we have consumed
more than we have produced. Table 1.2, Real Gross Domestic Product, www.bea.doc.gov., visited on
January 8, 2003.
79
U.S. Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 stat. 888(current version at 42 U.S.C. section 1437(2002)).
80
See Florence Wagman Roisman, Teaching About Inequality, Race, and Property, 46 ST LOUIS L. J.
665, 676 (2002); Thomas W. Hanchett, The Other “Subsidized Housing”: Federal Aid to
Suburbanization, 1940-1960’s in FROM TENAMENTS TO TAYLOR HOMES 163, 165 (John I. Bauman et.al.
eds.. 2000)).
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security during the depression by making it much easier for the average person to buy
and keep a home. 81
This was accomplished through the formation of the Home Owners Loan
Corporation (HOLC), the FHA and the VA. The FHA, created by the National Housing
Act of 1934,82 did not make mortgage loans but rather insured them. Because the FHA
began insuring these loans, lenders were much more willing to make loans with lower
down payments and at lower interest rates.83 This made mortgage loans more available
to the middle class than ever before.84 Owning a home became a nearly universal
American dream after World War II.85 As late as 1940, half of all young adults between
the ages of 20 and 24 lived with their parents.86 In the fifteen years following the war,
home ownership shot up to 62%.87 No one individual was more responsible for this
change than William Levitt, who built new cape cod homes and sold them for $7,990 in
the late 40’s,88 with little or no money down and a 4 1/2% interest rate.89
81

Perhaps I should say that this legislation made it easier for the average white person to buy and keep a
home. Numerous scholars have noted that at the same time that the FHA and VA reduced down payments
under these programs, minorities were refused such loans and instead lived in stingy, alienating public
housing projects, which hindered minority home ownership for the rest of this countries history. See
Roisman, supra note 84, at 676.
82
Alice O’Conner, Understanding Inequality in the Late Twentieth Century Metropolis: New Perspectives
on the Great Racial Divide, IN URBAN INEQUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM FOUR CITIES 22 (Alice O’Connor,
et.al.eds. 2001). See Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128 (1933) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§1461-1468 (1998)); see also National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat.
1246(1934) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §1716 (1988).
83
David Dante Troutt, Ghettos Made Easy: The Metamarket/Antimarket Dichotomy and the Legal
Challenges of the Inner-City Economic Development, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 427, 507 n. 146 (2002)
(stating that the FHA’s new lending model allowed for smaller down payments, lower interest rates, longer
repayment periods, and full loan amortization, making it easier for many homeowners to buy rather than
rent).
84
See id. Troutt notes that between 1936 and 1941, new home owners increased from 332,000 to 619,000.
See id.
85
See http://www.columbia.edu/~rr91/3082_lectures/feminine_mistique.htm, visited on January 11, 2003.
86
See id.
87
See id.
88
See id. William Levitt became:
the Henry Ford of home building by applying methods of mass production to housing. In the late
forties, William Levitt embarked on the biggest private housing project in American history.
Buying up 4,000 acres of potato fields in Hempstead, Long island, about 25 miles east of new
York City, he started work on 17,500 homes in what was to be known as Levittown. To minimize
costs, he broke down construction into 26 steps. Teams of workers executed specific tasks:
bulldozing the land, paving the roads, pouring foundations, [planting trees, joining the walls and
roof, installing the plumbing and electricity, and painting. Every house was identical, one story
high, covering 25 by 32 feet, with a living room, kitchen, two bedrooms and a bathroom. ….
Those cape cod homes became the single most powerful symbol of the dream of upward mobility
and home ownership for American families. With no down payment, a 30-year mortgage, and a
tax deduction for interest payments, it was cheaper to buy a house in Levittown, where mortgage
costs ran $56 per month, than to rent an apartment in New York, where apartment rentals averaged
$93 per month.
Id.
89
Electronic interview between Frederick Hart and Polly Dwyer, President of Levittown Historical Society,
on January 11, 2003. The rate was 4 ½% if there was no down payment and 4% if the purchaser put down
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These events forever changed the face of American consumerism and consumer
credit. They ultimately revolutionized the home finance industry, by making 20% down
payments the norm, rather than the previous 50% required,90 and by stretching home
loans out 25 or 30 years, as compared to the three years at which commercial banks were
lending, and finally, by amortizing the loans rather than having them end with balloon
payments.91 As a result of these and other more recent changes, 68% of Americans now
own their homes,92 a percentage higher than most other countries in the world.93 The
New Deal Legislation unquestionably led to this result, and, along with the advent of
private mortgage insurance, now allows Americans to buy a home with only 5% down.94
These conditions lead to more disposable income for Americans than any other group of
citizens in the world.95
Low down-payment loans in the United States have led to another uniquely
American phenomenon, the home equity loan. Home equity loan indebtedness has
substantially increased in a short period of time, from $60 billion in 1981 to $357 billion
in 199196. These types of loans are pushed non-stop through the media in the U.S., yet

$990. See id; see also The Next Crash: Is the Housing Market a Bubble that’s About to Burst?, THE NEW
YORKER, November 11, 2002, at 123 (discussing the Levittown development project).
90
See MARC A., WEISS, RISE OF THE COMMUNITY BUILDERS: THE AMERICAN REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY AND
URBAN PLANNING 32 (1987). Weiss states that the FHA began making 80% loans for 20 years when the
previous norm for commercial banks was 50% loans for three years. Twenty years later, the FHA began
making 90% loans for 25 years. See id.
91
See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUB-URBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 204
(1985).
92
See Local & The Carolinas Coastal Business, SUN-NEWS (Myrtle Beach, S.C.), April 6, 2002, at D1
(reporting a 67.8% home ownership rate in April of 2002, and noting that the Great plains and the Great
Lakes region had a rate of 73.9% and 72.7% percent respectively but that the Pacific Coast had a rate of
just 59.6%, showing a large variation across the country); see also REALTY TIMES, October 22, 1998,
http://realtytimes.com/news/rtcpages/19981022-hmownership.htm, visited on February 23, 2004 (reporting
a 66.8% home ownership rate in October of 1998); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/ann01ind.html, visited on January 17, 2003.
93
New Zelanders purportedly have the highest home ownership rate at 72% with Australia in second place
at 70.1%. See Australia Has World’s Second Highest Home Ownership Rate, ASIA PULSE, February 11,
2002. The U.S. is next at 67%, see Local & The Carolinas Coastal Business, supra note 96, at D1, and
Britain is next at 66%. See Not a Common European Home Economic Agenda, THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (
LONDON), August 18, 2002. Continental Europe ‘s rate is currently 59%, but of course, this number
represents an average of a number of different rates across Europe. See id.
94
Anyone who watches late night television knows that if you buy from the owner or the builder you can
often buy a home with no money down in the United States.
95
In Europe, a buyer seeking a loan from a lending institution is still expected to put down 50% in order to
get a home loan. http://www.remx-oa.com/resource/BuyersGuide/Arranging/Default.asp, visited on March
2, 2004. Even in Canada, 25% is a typical down payment. See id. Moreover, in many countries, homes can
only be purchased with cash. See id.
96
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX POLICY: MANY FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THE GROWTH IN
HOME EQUITY FINANCING IN THE 1980’S 3, 12-14 (1993). While home equity loans grew at a rate of 20%
per year between 1981-1991, other consumer debt increased by just 4% per year supra at 1. For a more
detailed exploration of the dilemma with home equity loans See Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the
American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Government’s Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69
TUL.L.REV. 373, 373 (1994).
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are virtually unheard of in Europe. 97 In fact, European concepts of land ownership are
completely different from U.S. concepts. The ownership of land and tenant rights in
England had their origin in the feudal system imposed by William I 98 with far more land
owned publicly and far more people owning homes and businesses on leased land. Thus,
there are far fewer home equity loans in Europe and the rest of the world and thus less
overall indebtedness.99
Lending found its true cornucopia in America, however, with the introduction of
the charge card in the 1960’s, followed by the credit card in the 1970’s and 1980’s.100
Since then, there has been no turning back.
B. American Consumer Culture: Buying Happiness
Americans are considered profligate in their personal lives as well as their
business lives, particularly in comparison to other world citizens.101 While the last subsection attempts to explain how these habits developed, this sub-section examines how
our society views debt today, and what current legal, cultural, and economic factors have
led to our “compulsively consumeristic” behavior.102 It also examines the financial and
other life conditions of most individual bankruptcy debtors in American, and discusses
whether there is a different bankruptcy or debt culture for American business debtors, as
compared to individual consumer debtors. 103
1.

How and Why We Spend it: Let us Count the Ways

97

A recent radio advertisement asks “Did you know that there currently is available over $30 billion in
equity in American real estate?”, it then admonishes listeners not to let this money waste and to call an 800
number immediately to get the cash they deserve out of their home.
98
Lord Madoc Arundel and Christopher T.C. Miller, The Governance of Real Property in England from
Henry I to the Second Reiteration of Magna Carta, http://www.pbm.com/~lindahl/articles/land_law.html,
visited on Nov. 5, 2003.
99
With this background, we can begin to understand how our bankruptcy system of debt forgiveness came
into being. What is not clear is whether the countries that are importing aspects of our bankruptcy system
actually need this system or will need it. Will they also become highly consumeristic because that is where
globalization will take them? Some Europeans, for example, are known for having one small closet filled
with a few expensive pieces of clothing whereas Americans prefer a huge closet full of moderately priced
items, a reflection of differing consumer cultures. Not all Europeans are cut from the same spending mold,
however. The Italians love beautiful things while northern Europeans would consider high-ticket fashion
items to be highly unnecessary.
100
See Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and Japan, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1055, 1064 (2002). As Mann explains, American Express, Diner’s Club, and Carte Blanche first offered
charge cards, which, as their name implies, had to be paid off each month. The big profits occurred with
the development of the credit card, and the resulting high interests rates to lenders. These did not blossom
until the 1970’s and the 1980’s in the United States and still have not done so throughout the rest of the
world. See id. Mann attempts to explain this phenomenon by examining the banking and lending systems
of the U.S. versus other parts of the worlds, particularly Japan. See id. at 1061-64.
101
Jacob S. Ziegel, The Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Debt, Discussed from a Canadian Perspective,
79 TEX. L REV.1241, 1244 (2001).
102
See id.
103
See THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 77, at 2 (discussing how increased volatility in the job
market, exploding amounts of available consumer credit, and privatized health care, all helped lead to
record bankruptcy numbers in recent years).
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Consumer spending is considered one of the most important indicators of
economic health in the American economy. 104 Despite the credit industry’s claims that
consumers are abusing credit, credit industry advertising encourages people to use as
much credit as they can get, for every use imaginable or no particular use at all.105 Some
advertisers rely on nostalgia to get people to borrow as much money as possible. For
example, in a mailer for a home equity loan, United Pan Am Mortgage writes:
[r]emember the days when dad worked, mom managed the home, and there was
still enough money for a house, cars, vacations …even college? It’s sure not like
that anymore. Today, with single parents or even with both parents working, it’s
hard to make ends meet, let alone have some of the good things life offers. We
think you deserve more and we can help. …A friendly phone call will get the ball
rolling on putting a lump sum in your pocket. That’s right –have the extra cash to
make those home improvements you’ve been putting off, take that vacation
you’ve been dreaming about, give yourself peace of mind, knowing your son or
daughter’s tuition is covered.106
The ad goes on to tell the recipient who to call to get a home equity loan and solve all of
life’s problems, demonstrating that despite popular belief, you can buy both happiness
and peace of mind.107
American popular culture oozes with references of spending and happiness. In
the tongue-in-cheek novel, Shopaholic Ties the Knot,108 Becky Bloomwood notes how
her whole life will change when she and her beau own the vintage cocktail cabinet she
spots in an antique shop:

104

Consumer spending is one of the major indicators by which the government and economists measure the
strength of our economy. Consumer spending makes up about two-thirds of our gross domestic product,
which is the broadest measure of economic health. When will we Spend Again?, supra note 8.
Consumer spending is widely believed to be a measure of overall consumer confidence. When a
household is deciding what it can afford, it will look at probable future income as well as current income.
If consumers are optimistic about the future economy, they will be inclined to spend their dispensible
income. If, however, they do not believe that good times lay ahead, they are more likely to save their
money. THOMAS MAYER, JAMES S. DUESENBERRY & ROBERT ALIBER, MONEY, BANKING, AND THE
ECONOMY 273 (Norton & Co. 1999).
105
One advertisement admonishes Americans to get the money they deserve by tapping into the $30
trillion dollars in equity currently available in American real estate. No mention is made of the need to pay
such funds back. In a title loan company add, a woman finds that as long as she takes out a title loan, she
has the money to go out to dinner after all. In another add, Mr. T tells a huge, slovenly debtor that all his
financial problems can be solved if he takes out a title loan. See Appendix, Case Study #4. In a MasterCard
advertisement, a man in cubicle becomes ecstatic beyond words when he wins a trip to Hawaii from his
benevolent credit card company. Businesses advertising on every network offer free credit for 6-12
months, as long as you spend a certain dollar amount, and even the government told Americans to go out
and spend money last fall (despite high bankruptcy rates and low savings rates) in order to breath life into
out flagging economy.
106
Sent to Professor Frederick M. Hart on September 30, 2002, on file with the author.
107
See id.
108
SOPHIE KINSELLA, SHOPAHOLIC TIES THE KNOT 8 (Delta 2002).
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Just think, if we had one of these in the apartment it would change our lives.
Every night Luke and I would mix martinis, and dance to old-fashioned songs,
and watch the sun go down. It’d be so atmospheric! We’d have to buy one of
those old-fashioned record players with the big horns, and start collecting 78s, and
I’d start wearing gorgeous, vintage tea dresses.109
As a result of relentless and unyielding admonitions to spend, as well as other
cultural factors, Americans have more debt of all kinds than all persons of all other parts
of the world.110 Consumer debt, second mortgages, foreclosures,111 and personal
bankruptcies are all at an all-time high.112 The average household carries $8,000113 in
credit card debt and record numbers of Americans now carry more than one mortgage.114
Between 1979 and 1997, personal bankruptcies increased by more than 400%.115 The
upsurge in the mid-nineties was particularly shocking because this was a period of
widespread economic recovery.116 History partially explains why this debt picture looks
so different from that of the rest of the world. Add a volatile economy and job market,

109

Id.
I respectfully disagree with Professor Ronald Mann’s conclusion that neither Japanese nor American
consumers are encouraged to over-extend. See Mann, supra note 100, at 1108 n. 107 (citing Robert D.
Manning, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S ADDICTION TO CREDIT 3 (2002).
Mann cites Robert Manning’s Credit Card Nation for the proposition that American society does not
venerate those who rely on credit beyond their income. See id. Unfortunately, I believe that Manning just
a voice in the wilderness on this point, American media having won the war against sensible credit use.
Personally, I find it impossible to spend a quiet evening at home without being barraged by credit
card and home refinancing options. New on the scene are those irritating and relentless “non-profit” credit
consolidation companies, who call as many as four times per week, insisting they can lower our huge
monthly payments, even though we do not carry a balance at all.
We also have found it next to impossible to cancel a credit card, being recently offered a waiver
of the monthly fee, and finally, a free airline ticket, if we would just not cancel.
111
Thomas A Fogarty, A record Number of U.S. Homeowners are Facing Foreclosure, and Many More
Are Falling Behind, September 11, 2002, http://www.survivalforum.com/modules.php?name=News&newtopic=23, visited on January 13, 2003. Fogarty reports that during April, May and June of 2002, 1.23% of
all mortgages- or 640,000 - were in foreclosure. See id. This is the highest rate recorded in the 30 years in
which this data has been kept, and is up from 1% just one year ago. See id.
112
See http/:abiworld.org/statistics, visited on December 4, 2003. Yet at least one scholar has wondered
why more U.S. households do not file for bankruptcy, concluding that as of 1998, only about 1% of
households file but 15% could benefit from such a filing. See Michelle J. White, Why Don’t More
Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L.ECON. 205-31 (1998).
113
See http://www.cardweb.com/cardlearn/faqs/2003/jan/8.xcml, visited on March 26, 2003.
114
See Riva D. Atlas, Home Equity Borrowing Rises to Worrisome Levels, N.Y. TIMES, March 26, 2003
(stating that home equity loan levels have reached such a high level that consumer groups think many
people will be unable to service these loans and will end up homeless). Some lenders, including Wells
Fargo Bank, are even ending up to 100% of the home’s value, despite that people often have insufficient
income to service such loans. Id.
115
See FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 77, at 3. Since World War II, personal bankruptcies have
steadily increased most years. These increases accelerated during the 1980’s and 1990’s, frequently
breaking records from quarter to quarter and year to year. See id
116
See id. As the authors state, financial collapse amidst all this prosperity was both mystifying and
worrisome. See id.
110
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and the credit industry’s voracious appetite for more lending and the statistics are not
surprising. 117
2. Personal Bankruptcy and Stigma in The United States
While some people insist that the stigma of bankruptcy is gone,118 empirical
research suggests that it may not be that simple.119 In their empirical Study, The Fragile
Middle Class, scholars and empiricists Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook, conclude that
bankruptcy is a treatment of a financial problem but is not itself the disease.120 They
conclude that unemployment or underemployment, illness and divorce are the primary
causes of bankruptcy in American, but that huge amounts of consumer debt in general
and credit card debt in particular, lower Americans’ threshold for collapse when financial
disasters strikes. 121
Credit card use in the United States has risen steadily every year since the cards
were introduced.122 In the fifteen years from 1980 to 1995, the amount of outstanding
revolving credit jumped sevenfold. 123Credit card debt doubled in just four years, from
$211 billion in 1993 to $422 billion in 1997. Both the number of cards and the balances
increased dramatically in this time period, yet three and a half billion credit card
solicitations were sent out thereafter in 1998, portending continuing increases.124 One
historical event explains the rise in credit card debt, namely deregulation of consumer
interest rates, which has made credit card lending more profitable than any other form of
117

Department of Labor Statistics indicate that between 1995 and 1997, eight million American workers
were displaced, and that by 1998, 50% were reemployed at their old salaries, 25% were earning 20% less,
and the other 25% were still unemployed. See FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 77, at 17.
118
This is a constant claim of the credit industry, though one credit card company’s own web page states
that “ While not definitive, the research appears to confirm the suspicion that bankruptcy no longer carries
the serious social stigma it once did. While many of the debtors expressed remorse over having to file for
bankruptcy, many appeared to take a more relaxed attitude.” See
http://www.abiworld.org/stats/visa/97qualitative.html, visited on March 2, 2004. This is hardly strong
proof that stigma is gone. See Once a stigma, Ch. 11 Seen as Management Tool, BOSTON BUSINESS
JOURNAL, July 12, 2002, at B1; Gregory E. Maggs, Book Review: Bankruptcy as a Business Tool, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 681, 684-87 (describing the development of strategic uses for Chapter 11, while reviewing a book
who’s name speaks for itself); Bankruptcy Boom, www.abcnews.com, August 15, 2002, visited on January
8, 2003; Explaining the Escalation in Personal Bankruptcies, www.spotlightonfinance.org, visited on
January 8, 2003.
119
See THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 77, at 263.
120
See id.
121
See id. at 22. While only 10% of the consumers in their empirical study reported that consumer or credit
card debt as the actual cause of their bankruptcy, in most cases, the debtor could have withstood the layoff,
illness or family breakup, if not for their crushing amounts of consumer debts. See id.
122
See id. at 123.
123
By the 1990’s economists speculated that Americans could tolerate no more credit card debt. Since
1993, however, growth in credit card debt has been greater than any other type of consumer loan. See id.
124
The bankruptcy debtors in the study carried more credit card debt than the average American, but most
Americans are now carrying more than they can afford to repay. This is because there is virtually no limit
to the amount of credit a person can obtain through credit cards. See id.
The credit card industry did not grow to its current size by being cautious about distributing cards.
See id. at 135. It grew because it distributed cards freely, and solicited new customers relentlessly, at a cost
of $100 in solicitation for every new card member acquired in 1994.
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lending.125 The more cardholders a company has, the more money it makes, even if this
is accomplished by lowering lending standards. 126
Sub-prime lending, meaning lending specifically to people who are living on the
edge, is the most profitable niche in lending.127 Yet traditional banking has declined in
profitability, making it necessary for lenders to make ends meet in other ways. A popular
long-term strategy is to get college students hooked on credit cars early, giving away free
t-shirts and requiring no income.128 Sixty nine-percent of students in 1999 had a credit
card and 20% had four or more.129
The existence of all this consumer credit does not mean that people do not feel
guilty when they fail to keep up with their payments. Studies show that most people feel
badly when they are unable to pay their debts,130 despite deep societal ambivalence about
consumer debt.131 Economists recommend that people save more to increase capital
investment and productivity while at the same time warning that increased consumption
is necessary to economic growth.132 In mainstream American news media, such as the
Wall Street Journal, consumer spending is consistently equated with happiness and
health.133 For example, in an Article titled Consumers Give Brighter Outlook, the author
claims that “[c]onsumers’ spirits picked up a bit in early December, an encouraging sign
for retailers hoping for a strong holiday season.”134 The story then claims that “consumer
125

See id.
Interest rates drive profitability and interest payments account for more than 80% of the profits of credit
card companies. The enormous profits available from people who charge up to the limit and pay only the
minimum monthly payment make delinquent cardholders the most valued customers in the business. See id.
127
See id. at 135-36.
128
See id. 137.
129
See id. In fact, some state legislatures have attempted to stem this tide by placing additional legal
guidelines and restrictions on credit card issuers who issue cards to minors. Unfortunately, these efforts
have not been very successful. See http://www.cardtrak/1999/march1.html., visited on January 13, 2002,
(reporting that on March 26, 1999, the Oklahoma state legislature declined to pass a law restricting
offerings to citizens under the age of 21).
130
See THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 77, at 139-40. We are, however, an immediate
gratification society with little willpower, a fact also demonstrated by our national obsession with food and
weight loss, and our well-documented obesity problems.
131
See id. at 23.
132
See Bankruptcy Blues Generate Consumer Blahs, http://today.uci.edu/releses/95releases/079ky95.html.
Moreover, in the wake of September 11th, President Bush told us that we could all fight terrorism by being
good consumers. George W. Bush, Speech to Congress, (Washington D.C., September 20, 2001)
(accessed from ABCNEWS.com, visited on January 6, 2003). The Federal Reserve then encouraged
consumer spending by repeatedly cutting interest rates over the next few months. U.S Economy Shrinks,
October 31, 2001, www.cnn.com, visited on January 7, 2003. Again on January 7, 2003, President Bush
delivered a speech in which he encouraged Americans to be good consumers in spite of the economic
stand-still. George W. Bush, Speech to Economic Club of Chicago, (Chicago, Illinois, January 7, 2003).
133
WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 16, 2002, at A2.
134
See id This top financial newspaper often devotes an entire two-page spread to bankruptcy and
consumer sentiments every singly day. For example, on Monday, December 16, 2002, a fairly typical day,
the feature story contained a comparison of Australian bankruptcy and U.S. bankruptcy, the sideline was
about United Airlines’ request to borrow $2.4 billion from its union’s pension plan to fund its Chapter 11,
along with this story about whether consumer spending would be “bright” enough to give retailers a
profitable Christmas season.
126
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sentiment” and “consumer attitudes” have improved, causing economists to conclude that
the waning economy might be improving.135
The nature of the U.S. economic system, however, makes some financial failure a
certainty. The dynamics of capitalism, combined with a thin social safety net, guarantee
that some families will fail:
[w]ithout universal health insurance to protect every family from the financial
ravages of illness and without higher levels of unemployment compensation to
cushion the effects of a layoff, each day, in good times and in bad, some families
will fall over the financial edge. And in a market that provides virtually unlimited
amounts of consumer credit, some people will accumulate a debt load that
eventually takes on a life of its own – swelling on compound interest, default
rates, and penalty payments until it consumes every available dollar of income
and still demands more. Just as the poor will always be with us, so will the
bankrupt middle class.136
A more protective consumer bankruptcy system seems to be directly related to the size of
the social safety net and the availability of consumer credit. 137 The United States
admittedly offers more families sanctuary in bankruptcy while at the same time offering a
wide open consumer credit economy with no limit on lending or interest rates, and few
protections from the economic consequences of other problems such as job loss, illness,
accidents and family breakdowns. 138 None of this makes bankruptcy pleasant, although

135

News stories of this kind equate good “moods” or “spirits” with high consumer spending, even though
more personal financial failures occur after the holidays than at any other time of year. It is not surprising
that we have as much debt as we do, when we are told that spending on consumer goods is critical to
keeping our economy viable. See id
136
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 77, at 3. Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook uncover a few surprising
facts about bankruptcy debtors in this study, including that bankruptcy rates are very similar across racial
and ethnic lines, see id. at 41-47, that bankruptcy debtors come from a cross-–section of occupations, see
id. at 55-58, that debtors tend to be from the middle rather than the lower classes, see id. at 59, and that
bankruptcy debtors are more likely to have attended college than the average citizen, see id. at 51-55. This
last statistic can be read several different ways. What the study actually showed was that bankruptcy
debtors were more likely to have attended college than the general population but less likely than average
to have graduated from college. Thus, more went to college but few graduated. Is it possible that the study
actually showed that bankruptcy debtors were more likely to try new things but less likely to stick with
them? These are not the conclusions drawn by the authors, see id., but the numbers did suggest these
alternative conclusions to me.
137
See id. at 259.
138
See id Whether these high levels of consumer bankruptcies are seen as a societal problem or not, it is
clear that consumer bankruptcy is the ultimate free-market solution to bad debt. It forces individual
creditors who have made voluntary decisions to lend to recoup the losses from bad loans, from the profits
of the good ones. And recoup they have, earning the highest profits in lending history despite all the
defaults. Bankruptcy is the market-driven choice to deal with privatized rather than socialized risk.
Moreover, while creditor-funded campaigns to restrict consumers’ access to bankruptcy have both popular
and successful in Congress, there have been no campaigns to restrict access to credit. That type of
legislation would be seen as anti-capitalist and paternalistic. Many would say that individuals should be
allowed to make their own choices about credit, and should be responsible for their own decision-making
and the resulting consequences. See id.
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at least it is available.139 While there may be more people filing for personal bankruptcy
in the United States than ever before, the “sting of failure is still sharply felt by those who
must publicly declare that they are bankrupt.”140 And, while some Americans may try to
buck the trend and consume less, strong societal pressures keep most of us spending. 141
3. Business Bankruptcy and Stigma in the United States.
When it comes to stigma, however, business bankruptcy in America is an entirely
different matter. 142 There seems to be less stigma associated with a failing business in
America than with a personal bankruptcy, probably due to our capitalist notion that some
risk is good and necessary to a well-functioning capitalist economy. We consider
business failure to be negative but not morally wrong. We rarely throw corporate officers
in jail for failing at business. In fact, in some industries, like the high-tech or dot.com
industries, going through a business failure can actually be seen as a badge of honor,
proof that the entrepreneurs were willing to take the kinds of risks necessary to fuel
capitalism. 143
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Data collected by the Consumer Federation of America suggests that despite the constant barrage of
solicitations, acceptance of new cards has finally stemmed to some extent. See
http://www.consumerfed.org/backpage/081402, visited on August 26, 2002. In the 12-month period ending
March 3, 2002, card issuers mailed five billion solicitations, nearly 50 per household. They now make
available more than $3 billion in unused credit, or $30,000 per household. Yet consumers are increasingly
rejecting more of these solicitations and refusing to expand their lines of credit. During the first three
months of 2002, revolving consumer debt declined by 29 billion, bringing the ratio of credit used to a low
of 22.1.See id. There is some indication that Brits are also cutting back a bit on credit. The Credit Card
research group (CCRG) reports that total credit card spending in the U.K. rose to 16.8 billion pounds, up
6.9% from the prior period. This rate of growth, while high, is lower that the increase for the same period
last year , which was 10%. See Credit Card Spending Eases, BBC News, November 6, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2409655.stm., visited on January 2, 2003.
My own sense is that if means testing is implemented in the U.S., this may eventually backfire on
the credit industry and cause at least the educated middle-class consumers to use less credit, thus reducing
the industry’s profit margins. If this happens, the industry may respond by granting more credit to less
educated and poorer consumers, increasing the gap between the haves and the have-nots. No doubt, the
credit industry is already recognizing that the new bill might not be good for business. In one article, the
banking industry itself stated that “[t]he one-sided provisions of this bill are bad news for consumers. But
they are also bad news for our industry. Consumers are our customers. By creating a form of debt
imprisonment, this bill will hobble the most important player in the world economy -- the American
consumer.” See Bankruptcy Bill Hurts Odds of Second Chance
,http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/invest/extra/P76658.asp, visited on March 4, 2004.
140
See id. at 260.
141
For help scaling back, see Bankrate’s Guide to Managing Credit, http://www.bankrate.com/news/creditmanagement, visited on March 2, 2004; NoDebtNoStress, http://home.quixnet/~meirich, visited on March
2, 2004.
142
Stephanie Gruner, Seeking a Second Chance: Is Failure Still a Dirty Word?” Wall Street Journal, June
21, 1999, at A1; see also Bankruptcy and a Fresh Start: Stigma on Failure and Legal Consequences of
Bankruptcy, http/:europa.eu.int/comm./enterprise/entrepreneurship/support_measures/failu…/bankruptcy.ht
(report of U.S.), visited on March 17, 2003 (stating that although the stigma associated with filing for
Chapter 11 has diminished substantially, “the decision to file for Chapter 11 is never an easy one.”).
143
See Gruener, supra note 142, at A1 (stating that while it is sometimes considered a positive thing when a
U.S. entrepreneur fails in business, the same cannot be said in Europe, where considerable stigma still
exists).
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In other industries, we seem to recognize as a society that one-time events can
cause business failure or that sometimes a change in market conditions cannot be
predicted and is better softened by Chapter 11 if the company is at stake. In any case, we
do not like business failure but we find it more acceptable than personal bankruptcy.144
This distinction appears to be shared throughout most of the world. Unlike the rest of the
world, however, we also recognize that personal financial failure can be caused by
business failure, and thus provide systems to help both failing businesses and failing
individuals.145
C. Thumbnail sketch of the American Systems: Debt Forgiveness for both
Individuals and Business
The bankruptcy systems that have resulted from the history, politics, and culture
discussed above are also unique. First and foremost, they allow each bankruptcy debtor a
choice about whether to attempt to pay back creditors or to just give up and walk away
from debt.146 This choice is generally not available in other parts of the world. 147
Moreover, as discussed below, businesses that are reorganizing can continue to operate
through a Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding that is not overseen by a court-appointed
administrator.148
1. Personal Bankruptcy in America: An Overview
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This could also be due to the uniquely American corporate concepts of limited liability, given that we
tend to see businesses as entities separate and apart from their owners and managers. See Joseph A.
McCahery, Comparative Perspectives on the Evolution of the Unincorporated Firm: An Introduction, 26 J.
CORP. LAW, 803, 807 (2001) (discussing how some European scholars believe, for example, that extending
limited liability to small firms will cause moral hazard and that as such, the costs of extending limited
liability to such firms would outweigh the benefits to society of doing so).
145
Bi-partisan politics continue to play an important role in the development of bankruptcy laws, though in
some respects these politics are counter-intuitive. The credit industry, particularly the consumer credit
industry, has pushed tremendously in recent years for stricter bankruptcy laws for consumers, that require
larger paybacks on old debts. These sentiments, though not entirely partisan, are generally thought to be
Republican or conservative sentiments. Underlying these views is a strong belief that individuals have
irresponsibly overspent. Yet Republican or big-business interests, or even those interested in fueling the
economy, have consistently admonished Americans to do the right thing and spend even more, for the sake
of economic growth. This seems inconsistent with the bankruptcy crack-down, given that the government
official who have admonished us to spend, as a group, know full well that most people now have more debt
than they can repay and that savings rates are now negative in the U.S. Spending without going into debt
is not an economic reality, yet we are still encouraged to do it. Moreover, the much-decried bankruptcy
crack-down is most likely to hurt consumer credit interests rather than help them, when people reduce
spending in reaction to the bankruptcy crack-down.
On the other side of this political coin, it is no less ironic. Very liberal persons, though certainly
not all democrats, favor debtor-oriented bankruptcy laws like the ones in place now. However, some of
these people believe that excess spending on the part of Americans is so harmful to society that it could
ultimately destroy the world and its resources. While this would be deeply disturbing if true, the idea of not
spending is almost un-American. Clearly, Americans operate in a culture of consumption and spending
unlike any other in the world.
146
SKEEL supra note 37, at 1-2.
147
See id.
148
See id.
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Personal bankruptcies in the United States take one of two general forms. One
can either give up all of one’s non-exempt assets,149 in exchange for an almost immediate
discharge of most of one’s unsecured debts,150 or one can choose to pay off creditors,
either in whole or in part over a period of three to five years, in which case one does not
need to give up his or her non-exempt assets as long as he or she pays at least the value of
those non-exempt assets to creditors under the payout plan.151 Again, the debtor, rather
than creditors, makes this choice.152 The pay-out style bankruptcy also allows one to cure,
stretch out and sometimes reduce, secured debt that has gone into default, thereby forcing
new payment terms on the secured creditor, who is precluded from repossessing its
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In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy an estate is created to collect and sell property to satisfy the debt
of the debtor. However, a debtor can claim certain assets exempt from the bankruptcy estate
not to be sold for the benefit of the creditors. “The historical purpose of exemption laws has
been to protect a debtor from his creditors, to provide him with the basic necessities of life so
that even if his creditors levy on all of his nonexempt property, the debtor will not be left
destitute and a public charge.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6087. In the United States a debtor filing bankruptcy may choose between
the federal or state exemptions, See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (b) if the state the debtor is filing has not
“opted-out” of the federal bankruptcy exemption scheme. Some examples in the federal
exemption system are: 1) up to $17,425 of equity in real or personal property used as a
homestead (11 USCA § 522 (d) (1)), 2) up to $2,775 in one motor vehicle (§ 522 (d) (2),( 3)
up to $9,300 in household furnishings (§ 522 (d) (3),( 4) up to $1,150 of jewelry (§ 522 (d)
(4)), 5) $925 in any property (usually checking accounts) and if the debtor did not use the
homestead exemption up to an additional $8,725 (§ 522 (d) (5), 6) up to $1,750 in professional
books or tools of the trade (§ 522 (d) (6)), and the debtors right to receive payment for certain
things such as social security, veteran benefits, and alimony (§ 522 (d) (10)) (all the dollar
figures are updated by the United States Congress periodically to reflect economic conditions).
State exemption schemes were developed not because of bankruptcy but because collection
laws. Because each state has their own exemption legislation there is a quite a bit of difference
between states. A person filing in Delaware, which has opted-out of the federal scheme, can
only choose the Delaware exemptions which are not generous. For example a debtor can only
exempt books, clothing, a seat or a pew in church, sewing machines, tools of the trade (limited
to a certain amount is some counties, and pianos (See 10 Del. C. §4902). Delaware does not
even have any type of homestead exemption. Texas allows not only unlimited homestead
exemptions (see Tex. Prop. Code§40.01), but also up to $30,000 in personal property which
includes household furniture, tool and equipment, clothing, jewelry, firearms, and motor
vehicles (see Tex. Prop. Code§42.002). But Texas does not allow a checking account to be
exempt like the federal exemptions. Unlike Texas, Florida has opted out of most of the federal
exemptions (see Fla. Stat. § 222.20 (2002)) (Florida allows all federal §522 (d) (10)
exemptions). Florida also has an unlimited homestead exemption (Fla. Const. Art. I, § 4(a)(1)
(2002)). However, Florida has modest personal property exemption. Only up to $1,000 in
personal property (Fla. Const. Art. I, § 4(a)(2) (2002)) (Fla. Stat. § 222.25 (2002)) and money
contributed to retirement funds (§222.21) and college trust funds (§222.22).
150

This is considered a straight liquidation bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq.
151
This is considered a restructured debt plan under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. See
11 U.S.C. § 1301 et. seq.
152
See SKEEL, supra note 37, at 2.
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collateral as long as the plan payments are made.153 Additionally, Chapter 7 bankruptcy is
almost entirely non-interventionist because, assuming there is no objection from a
creditor to a debtor’s discharge, the debtor is granted a discharge automatically.154
The U.S. personal bankruptcy system is unquestionably the most forgiving in the
world, and strongly encourages persons who have failed financially to get back into the
economy and try again.155 In many states, the exemptions are extremely generous,
sometimes allowing individual debtors to an unlimited amount of equity in a home.156
Research suggests that states with higher exemptions, and that thus allow an individual
debtor to keep more assets free from creditor claims, have the highest levels of
entrepreneurship in the country, again establishing the connection between business
activity and an incentive to take risks.
2. The American Business Reorganization Scheme and Its Rationale.
The theory behind a Chapter 11 reorganization case in the United States is that a
business enterprise157 is often worth more to creditor alive than dead.158 In other words, a
business may be able to pay creditors more by continuing to operate its business and
paying creditors a distribution over time from its future profits, rather than simply
liquidating its assets and paying creditors from the liquidation proceeds. Alternatively, a
debtor can sell its business as a going concern while in Chapter 11, leaving enough time
to sell property so that a good price can be realized for the business enterprise, and then
using the proceeds to pay creditors through what is called a liquidating Chapter 11
plan.159 In either case, the business is operated for a time while in Chapter 11, in order to
avoid the waste that could occur if a business with accumulated good will was simply
liquidated at the first sign of financial failure.160 For the benefit of stakeholders such as
153

See 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (b)(2) allowing for the modification of secured claims except secured claims on
real property. This option of modifying a secured creditors interest is not available under a Chapter 7
bankruptcy.
154
See 11 U.S.C §727.
155
Jacob Ziegel, Canada’s Phased-in Bankruptcy Reform, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 383, 395 (1006).
156
See Tex. Prop. Code§42.002; Fla. Stat. § 222.20 (both allowing unlimited homestead exemptions).
157
Chapter 11 is available to corporations, partnerships, as well as individuals. Because it is complicated
and expensive in terms of legal fees, an individual normally will file a Chapter 13 instead, if his or her
debts fall within the debt limitations, namely the debtor has noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of
less than $290,525 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $871,550. See 11 US.C § 109
(e).
158
See Davis, supra note 13, at 253.
159
In fact, the debtor is permitted to sell off its assets piece-meal in a Chapter 11, even before a plan is
filed, despite that the formal name of this chapter of the code is reorganization. See Davis; supra note 13, at
256, about 20-30% of confirmed plans are liquidation plans. See id; see also E. Flynn, Statistical Analysis
of Chapter 11, 12 (Administrative Office of US Courts, Bankruptcy Division 1989).
160
The French commercial system takes actual steps to prevent companies from getting into too much
financial trouble. Judges of the Commercial courts have the power to summon the CEO of any company
that appears to be in financial trouble. Once summoned an informal hearing is held to discuss the
information gathered by the court (the information is collected by the Clerk of the Court which is also
basically the Registrar of Companies, which has filed information, such as liens, mortgages, and
preferences, on each company in the territory). The CEO is allowed to inform the judge of the types of
measures the company is taking to right itself. After the hearing the judge can 1) accept the measures
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creditors, equity holders or owners, and employees, it is sometimes more efficient and
less wasteful to allow the business to reorganize its affairs, either through restructuring its
debt, by obtaining new equity owners or both.161 While this theory is not without its
critics,162 the overwhelming worldview today is that some system for “rescuing” ailing
businesses is a pre-condition to maintaining a vibrant, capitalist economy.163
The shocking difference between American-style reorganization and most others
around the world is that current management of the failing company normally stays in
place with no administrator directly overseeing the system.164 The historical
development of this unique system derives from the first railroad reorganizations, which
were among the first big businesses in America.165 At the time that Monroe Railroad and
Banking, Co. defaulted on its obligations to its lenders, there was no mechanism in place
to address this failure other than the lender’s right to foreclose and the court’s equitable
right to appoint a receiver to take over the debtor’s assets.166 Because piece-meal sale of
the debtor’s assets would result in great financial loss to all, the court merged these two
discussed by the CEO, 2) gather more information concerning the company from many sources, 3) the
CEO can file for a court agent to oversee the company, and 4) urge the CEO to file for protection under
French law. See Views From the Bench, supra note 6, at 536-39.
161
Sometimes equity is distributed to the unsecured creditor class under the plan of reorganization. See 11
U.S.C. § 1129.
162
Some scholars feel that Chapter 11 is not worth its astronomical costs, or its drag on the economy,
particularly given the relatively low success rate for reorganizing companies. See Barry E. Adler,
Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 312-13
(1993); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy A Reply to Warren, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 815, 827-28 (1987) (stating that bankruptcy creates benefits to bankrupt companies that are
not available to others, creating perverse incentives to file and giving some companies an unfair
advantage); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Chapter 11 Corporate Reorganization, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 127, 128 (1996); James W. Bowers, Wither What Hits the Fan? Murphy’s Law, Bankruptcy Theory,
and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27 (1991) (arguing that Chapter 11
offers little to justify its existence); Michael Bradley and Michael Rosensweig, The Untenable Case for
Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1049-50 (1992) (arguing that because equity holders rarely recover
anything in Chapter 11, Chapter 11 should be repealed); Thomas Jackson and Robert Scott, On the Nature
of Bankruptcy: An Essay and Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditor’s Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 160
(1981) (questioning the incentives created by the current bankruptcy system). but see Gross, supra note 10,
at 5 (claiming that 20%, one of the estimates of success rates in Chapter 11, is a respectable rate, and
evidence of the system’s success).
It is true that Chapter 11 fees are notoriously expensive. Enron attorneys have spent over $331
million dollars as of March 2003, and the company was still nowhere near confirming a plan at that time.
See Kristen Hays, Enron Proposes New Pipeline Business, ASSOCIATED PRESS, March 19, 2002, 2003 WL
16151125;see also Lucian Ayre Bebchuck, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganization, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 775, 780-81 (1988) (describing the numerous costs and inefficiencies in the current Chapter 11
scheme). Also, in highly regulated industries, with large infrastructures, critics have argued that the Chapter
11 of one player in a closed industry can be unfair and harmful to the other firms in the industry, and even
weaken the other firms, by allowing the company in bankruptcy to externalize pre-petition debts and
undercut market prices, therefore recovering a greater market share. See Sarah McBride, Australia’s
Tough-Minded Bankruptcies May Serve as Role Model, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 16, 2002, at A1.
163
See Metzger & Bufford, supra note 4, at 153-54.
164
While scholars have regularly noted that old management is often replaced with new management as the
case proceeds, this is often because old management wishes to resign.
165
Skeel, supra note 37, at 57.
166
See id.
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legal concepts and ordered that the lender sell the assets all at once, pursuant to a going
concern sale, rather than piece-meal.167
Amazingly, this tiny innovation in foreclosure practice, which took place in the
narrow context of failing U.S. railroads, led to a new way of looking at reorganization
and value. Lenders continued to threaten foreclosure, but did not always follow through.
Moreover, courts began appointing a receiver in each case, who would watch over and
protect the debtor’s property and to request an injunction against creditor collection
efforts. 168 This process was known as equity receivership and allowed the business to
continue in operation while the parties attempted to negotiate a favorable resolution of
the debt. 169 Ultimately, after many twists and turned, the current Chapter 11 system
emerged from this humble start.
3. The Logistics of Chapter 11 Business Reorganization.170
Bankruptcy cases, of which Chapter 11 is one kind, are presided over by a
specialized bankruptcy court, that is part of the federal judicial scheme171. The law in
place is the Federal Bankruptcy Code,172 although some principles used in bankruptcy
cases arise from state law173. When an enterprise is in Chapter 11, it normally operates
its own business through its pre-filing management.174 No trustee is ordinarily appointed.
As soon as a debtor files a voluntary175 Chapter 11 case, an automatic stay goes into
effect, effectively stopping all collection activity against the debtor or any of its property
of any kind.176 The stay is broad and powerful and even things that one would not think
would be stay are indeed stayed.177 For example, secured creditors are prohibited from
taking any action to repossess collateral that they could repossess if not for the
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Id.
Id.
169
Id. at 58.
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Chapter 11 can also be used by individuals. See 11 U.S.C.§ 109(d).
171
See 28 U.S.C. §157(a).
172
11 U.S.C. §§101, et. seq.
173
For example property exempt from judicial proceedings, see note 146, and concepts of property
("Unless a particular federal interest requires a different result, property interests are created and defined by
state law." Butner v. Unites States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
174
Although it is unusual, a party in interest may seek the removal of the debtor and have a trustee
appointed by showing cause, such as fraud or mismanagement. This is in order to protect interests of
creditors equity hold. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (a); but see In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217 (3rd Cir.
1989), (in which appellate court reluctantly upheld trial courts decision to appoint a trustee because the
debtor in possession had been unable to turn company around, debtor had conducted questionable transfers
of property, virtually violated its fiduciary duty by not pursuing claims to recover such transferred property,
and where the debtor itself had proven to be dishonest).
175
In the United States, the vast majority of cases filed under any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code are
voluntary cases. See Nathalie Martin, Que Es La Diferencia?: A Comparison Of The First Days Of A
Business Reorganization Case In Mexico And The United States, 10 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 73, 75 (2002).
176
See 11 U.S.C. §362.
177
See Martin supra note 175, at 75. “[T]here is a very broad, automatic stay granted in favor of the debtor.
This stays virtually all collection activity that is out there, … …employee claims, labor claims, every
lawsuit that is out there.”
168
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bankruptcy.178 Even the government is precluded from collecting on its claims.179
Virtually all enterprises,180 and even individuals,181 are eligible for Chapter 11 and there
is no requirement that the debtor be insolvent in anyway.182 Chapter 11 can be used as a
strategic measure, to stop lawsuits, to stop foreclosures, or for whatever purpose the
debtor chooses.183 Practically speaking, one of the most beneficial features of Chapter 11
is the captive audience that the debtor-in-possession has in its bankruptcy judge, who is
available in record time to hear any emergency that could affect the debtor’s chances at
rehabilitation.184
The debtor’s goal in the case is to emerge from Chapter 11 with its debts
restructured and also reduced in amount in most case. This goal is achieved by obtaining
approval of a Chapter 11 plan outlining how, to what extent and over what time period
debts will be repaid.185 Creditors are allowed to vote on the debt restructuring plan, thus
allowing them to choose whether to go along with the debtor’s plan, propose their own
plan, or choose to liquidate the debtor’s business.186 If the debtor can get most creditors
to vote in favor of the plan, it can be forced on the dissenting creditors who will also be
bound by it.187 Sometimes the debtor can approve a plan even if most creditors vote
against the plan, although this is rare.188
178

See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (3). For a secured creditor, any party in interest for that matter, must ask the
court for permission to lift the stay in order to proceed for repossession. The court will only grant relief for
limited circumstances, see 11 U.S.C. § 362 (d); see also Martin, supra note167, at 81.
179
See Martin, supra note175, at 79, citing 11 U.S.C. § 362 (stating that even government entities must stop
all collection efforts, and can only maintain lawsuits against entities in bankruptcy if the issue affects health
and public safety, which is interpreted very narrowly); see also In re Universal Life Church, Inc., 128 F.3d
1294 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998)( finding that the Section 362 (b)(4) police and
regulatory exceptions to an automatic stay “refers to the enforcement of laws affecting health, welfare,
morals and safety, but not regulatory laws that directly conflict with the control of the res or property by
the bankruptcy court.”). Id at 1297. The two tests to determine if a government action is police and
regulatory in nature are the "pecuniary purpose" test and the "public policy" test, id citing NLRB v.
Continental Hagen Corp., 932 F.2d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). “Under the pecuniary purpose test, the court
determines whether the government action relates primarily to the protection of the government's pecuniary
interest in the debtor's property or to matters of public safety and welfare. [NLRB]. If the government action
is pursued solely to advance a pecuniary interest of the governmental unit, the stay will be imposed.” Id,
citing In re Thomassen, 15 B.R. 907, 909 (9th Cir. BAP 1981)
180
See 11 U.S.C. §109 (d), defining who can be a debtor under Chapter 11. Some examples of entities
excluded from Chapter 11 are insurance companies, banks, savings bank, cooperative bank, savings and
loan association, building and loan association, and homestead association. These exclusions include both
domestic and foreign entities.
181
See 11 U.S.C. § 109(d).
182
See Martin supra note 175, at 77.
183
See Maggs, supra note 119, at 686 (discussing how Texaco filed its Chapter 11 case in order to delay
collection on Penzoil’s $10 million judgment, and ultimately to gain leverage to settle the judgment for $3
million).
184
For example, United Airlines just discovered that the IRS owes a $360 million tax refund, and because
United is in bankruptcy, this money will be forthcoming far more quickly than usual. See IRS Owes United
$360M Refund: But a Federal Investigation Puts Money on Hold, USA TODAY, March 24, 2003, at B1
(discussing how the bankruptcy court is involved and how settlement may be forthcoming immediately).
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Debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan for 120 days, see 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(2).
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See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)
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See id.
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See id.
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Secured creditors are normally paid in full with interest, up to the lesser of the
amount of the loan or the value of the collateral. If the debt is undersecured, all the
deficiency claims become unsecured claims.189 Some creditors, such as taxing authorities
and employee claims, are entitled to special priority190 and must be paid in full in the
plan.191 Unsecured creditors are often paid a distribution over time, and are very rarely
paid in full. The amounts not paid are discharged at the end of the case and never paid.192
There is no set amount of distribution that unsecured creditors must receive, but the
debtor needs unsecured creditors’ votes and thus often offers as much as it can afford to
pay.193
Existing equity can retain their ownership of the debtor firm, but only if the
unsecured creditors agree or if unsecured creditors are paid in full.194 In a sense,
creditors get to choose, through the voting rights195, whether to go along with the
reorganization plan or alternatively, to liquidate the debtor’s business. In reality,
however, the debtor retains control over the case and the plan process throughout the case
in most instances, and has the exclusive right to file a plan for at least the first four
months of the case and often much longer.196 This leaves many creditors feeling like
hostages in a debtor-friendly proceeding. A case cannot go on forever, however. 197 A
business that is losing money will be liquidated almost immediately because the case is
not likely to succeed at reorganization and any delay will hurt creditors.198
D. Conclusions about the American Scheme and its Societal Role.
American bankruptcy systems did not emerge randomly or in a vacuum, but through
conscious modern and historical decisions about the role of credit and money in
American society. These attitudes and conditions are unique and are not present in other
countries, including those countries currently adopting our systems. This may limit the
effectiveness of the imported systems, and should lead countries that are adopting new
systems to study other systems as well, and to consider local culture when enacting new
laws.
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See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (a). “An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the
estate has an interest… …is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the
estate’s interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is
an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest or the amount so subject to setoff
is less than the amount of such allowed claim.” This is commonly referred to as bifurcation.
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See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (a)
191
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a) (9)
192
See 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (d)
193
A 30% distribution has always struck me as acceptable, though it depends on the case.
194
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a) (8). However, if under a plan a unsecured creditor is impaired by the plan the
court can still approve the plan if it is shown that the unsecured creditor would have received as much
under a Chapter 7 liquidation plan, See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a) (7) (A) (ii).
195
However, if the creditor if the creditor is not impaired by the plan and votes against the plan the Court
can still verify the plan. See id.
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See 11 U.S.C. § 1121.
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See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a) (11).
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Id.
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III. CROSS-CULTURAL ATTITUDES TOWARD DEBT: UNRIPE GROUND FOR
TRANSPLANTATION

Around the world, people are less forgiving about debt forgiveness than they are
in the U.S. 199 In some parts of the world, not paying debts is the ultimate disgrace.200 In
other parts of the world, there simply is no personal bankruptcy system,201 and little in the
way of business reorganization either.202 Despite this, many countries are starting to
move toward a U.S. bankruptcy reorganization model for businesses and some are also
replicating forgiving personal bankruptcy laws.203 Given the unique cultural, economic
and historical development of the U.S. systems, however, this may be impractical. This
Section describes cultural attitudes toward debt in a few other parts of the world, that are
currently in the process of importing U.S. bankruptcy-style laws. It suggests that history
cannot be the sole driving factor in determining which bankruptcy system and philosophy
a country develops, by describing the very different system and attitudes of England, 204
from which our original bankruptcy system arose. By way of further example, it then
describes attitudes toward debt and bankruptcy in parts of continental Europe, as well as
Japan, as a contrast to the American attitudes previously discussed. The laws of these
countries are also briefly examined, in order to discuss the role of both transplantation as
well as local culture, in enacting such laws.205
A. Historical Bankruptcy Perspectives Outside the U.S.: England as an Example
Because of its long history of commerce, England never had to sprint to catch up
or otherwise create a quick market economy.206 Thus, from its inception, English
bankruptcy had a very different emphasis and flavor than early American bankruptcy
law.207 England’s first bankruptcy laws were created in 1543.208 The preamble to this
law described the bankruptcy debtor as an anti-social, immoral, character who regularly
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See infra notes 206-61 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 480-90 and accompanying text.
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See infra notes 238-45 and accompanying text.
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See infra notes 262-70 and accompanying text.
203
See infra notes 375-86 and accompanying text.
204
England, as well as Canada and Australia, have relatively lenient personal bankruptcy systems by world
standards. See Efrat, supra note 3, at 88-90. Other countries that have more lenient personal bankruptcy
systems, besides the U.S., England, Canada and Australia, include Hong Kong, New Zealand, Taiwan,
Russia, Scotland and the Netherlands. Virtually all of these countries impose a Chapter 13-like payment
plan on at least some bankruptcy debtors before granting them a discharge. See id.
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See infra notes 233-302, 375-411, 423-443, and 498-507 and accompanying text.
206
Like many other European nations, it developed its commercial economy over a long period of time,
with typical ebbs and flows but continued growth from 1805, at the early beginnings of the industrial
revolution, to the present.
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See Tabb, History of Bankruptcy supra note 34, at 7 (1995)(noting that early English bankruptcy law
was harsh). Professor Tabb notes, however, that English law was hardly unique at the time in its tough
treatment of bankruptcy debtors. Common punishments around the world included forfeiture of all
property, relinquishment of the consortium of a spouse, imprisonment and death. Early stories claim that in
Rome, creditors were permitted to carve up the body of a debtor. See id.
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See Robert Weisberg, Commercial Mortality, The Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable
Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 20 (1986).
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took advantage of others.209 The law itself was designed solely for the benefit of
creditors and was virtually criminal in nature.210 Bankruptcy was something creditors
“did” to the debtor, an involuntary social condition to which a naughty use of credit was
subjected against his will. 211 Not surprisingly, then, early English bankruptcy laws were
filled with numerous penalties and punishments for non-payment, the most well known
of which was to “suffer as a felon, without the benefit of clergy,” a polite phrase for the
death penalty.212 While few were actually subject to death for failing to pay ones bills,
debtors’ prison was common,213 as was being shunned by society in Dickensian
fashion.214
There was no debtor discharge, though there was plenty of credit, even as early as
the 1600’s.215 The first debtor discharge was introduced in the Statute of Anne in 1705,
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See id. The Preamble stated that “Where divers and soondry persones craftelye obteyning into theyre
hands greate substaunce of other mennes goods doo sodenlie flee to partes unknowne or kepe theyre
houses, not mynding to paie or restore to any of theyre creditours theyre debtes and dueties, but at theyre
owne willes and pleasures consume the substaunce obteyned by credyte of other men, for theyre owne
pleasure and delicate lyving, againste all reasone equity and good conscience . . .”
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See id. at 3.
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See Tabb, Evolution of Discharge, supra note 34, at, 336 (1991) (stating that in 1542 Parliament enacted
the first English bankruptcy law, 34 & 35 Henry 8, chapter 4, entitled "An act against such persons as do
make bankrupts." As the title indicates, the act was not passed with any heed for the interests of the debtor.
Instead, it was intended to give creditors another collection remedy. The new remedy lay against all
fraudulent and absconding debtors (but not merely unfortunate debtors), referred to throughout the act as
"offenders." This act, along with all of the early bankruptcy laws, was quasi-criminal in nature, and
provided for the imprisonment of the offender if necessary. A British commentator notes that "the law
seems at that time to have been administered with considerable severity." Id. Under this act (and for almost
three centuries hence) bankruptcy was purely involuntary as to the debtor. The right to commence a
bankruptcy proceeding rested solely in the hands of the creditors of the debtor. This limitation was
perfectly consistent with the rationale of the act, which was to protect creditors and thus facilitate
commerce. Upon notice the various assets of the debtor were seized, appraised, and sold, and the proceeds
were distributed pro rata to all creditors proving just claims.
The first voluntary bankruptcy in England was passed in 1844 and applied to traders only. See id.
at 353-54. This was extended to non-merchants in 1861. See id.
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See Tabb, Evolution of Discharge supra note 34 at 327; but see Weisburg supra note 208, at 4.
Weisburg looks at a 1697 treatise by Daniel Defoe, vocal commentator on bankruptcy law and its impact
on society. In his “Essay on Projects”, Defoe sets out that the laws of England are, “generally good, and
above all things are temper’d with Mercy, Lenity, and Freedom. But bankruptcy law has something in it of
Barbarity; it gives loose to the Malice and Revenge of the Creditor, as well as a Power to right himself,
while it leaves the Debtor no way to show himself honest: it contrives all the ways possible to drive the
debtor to despair, encourages no new Industry, for it makes him perfectly incapable of anything but
starving.” Sentiments such as Defoe’s clearly show that society, as a whole, was conscious of the ill effect
the law had on the average bankrupt. Id.
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See Tabb, History of Bankruptcy, supra note 34, at 7.
214
For an example of Britain’s historical perception of bankruptcy in the nineteenth century, one should
read Dickens’ “Little Dorrit.” The story is about a father and his family living and growing up in a debtor’s
prison (Swansea). Dickens’ tale is not unlike Defoe’s sentiment in supra note 6. Essentially, the bankrupt
was treated like a leper, and the prison was like a leper colony Mr. Dorrit, finally gets out of prison, after
receiving a windfall in inheritance, spends it all, and then dies before being forced to return to debtor’s
prison. The story’s main focus is on how bankruptcy impacts the family unit, and how it is truly punitive in
nature.
215
See Tabb, Evolution of Discharge, supra note 34 at 330.
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but this provision was only in place for three years.216 The debtor discharge later became
part of the permanent law, but was granted upon application only, rather than
automatically, after the debtor proved that he had been honest and had cooperated with
creditors.217 Until 1705, a bankruptcy discharge was only available to merchants, as
credit was seen as unnecessary and even a fraud if obtained outside the commercial
context.218 Unlike the early American economic climate, in which every man was seen as
a potential merchant who could help grow the economy, early English society accepted
credit only as a necessary evil.219 While laws themselves became more lenient over time,
this attitude toward debt and credit never really changed.
B. Attitudes Toward Debt in England Today.
Even today, Brits are sensitive about financial failure.220 They generally consider
such failure a failure of character and consider it extremely negative if a person, or even a
business, fails financially. Strictly personal bankruptcies, resulting from too much credit
card debt or the loss of a job or good health, have been rare in the past because there was
little consumer credit, and government programs helped people if they lost employment
or needed health care.221 Now there is more credit and more personal financial failure.
While the UK certainly has more bankruptcies than the rest of the EU,222 these are
still considered major embarrassments, even if they result from the failure of a business.
223
Executives in a company that fails can have a very difficult time finding another job,
and are often shunned socially.224 Thus, despite all the new credit available, the British
marketplace comes down hard on those who have gotten into financial difficulty. The
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See id. Tabb also notes that discharge was not automatic. The bankrupt needed to receive a “certificate
of conformity.” To receive this, the bankrupt needed to voluntarily surrender to an examination by the
court, full disclosure, and delivery of all the bankrupt’s assets to the court. The court maintained the power
to deny the certificate, but this discretion was seldom used. What’s interesting is that creditors at the time
had no power to block the bankrupt’s receipt of the certificate. One could argue that this was one of the first
pro-debtor bankruptcy law, but as will be seen the act lasted all but three years.
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See id. This provision is still popular in the personal bankruptcy laws of many countries today. See infra
notes 347-70 and accompanying text.
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See Tabb, Evolution of Discharge, supra note 34, at 331.
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See Weisberg, supra note 208, at 66. As Professor Weisberg notes, in the U.S., bankruptcy law was
seen as a “robust, economical, and scientific instrument of commercial efficiency, in England credit was
morally-tinged and represented false wealth to many people in traditional land-based society. See id.
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See infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
221
See James A. Morone and Janice M. Goggin, Health Policies in Europe: Welfare States in a Market
Era, 20 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY AND LAW 557, 558, 563 (1995) (noting that England currently has a
state-run health care system but that it and other similar European systems may soon be “Americanized”).
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See Efrat, supra note 3, at 100-01.
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As an example of how harsh the “bankrupt” was treated by the early British code, consider that a
nonconforming bankrupt was subject to the death penalty and that to obtain a discharge the bankrupt had
“to (i) secure a certificate of conformity from a majority of "bankruptcy commissioners," (ii) obtain such a
certificate from four-fifths of creditors, in value and number, and (iii) swear that the creditor certificates
"were obtained fairly and without fraud." Peter V. Pantaleo Basic Business Bankruptcy, 614 PLI/Comm
7April-May, 1992
224
See id.
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attitude is “once a bankrupt, always a bankrupt”.225 The British government now wants
to change these attitude in order to encourage people who have failed to go back into
business and help fuel Britain’s flagging economy.226 Yet it is unclear that one can
change attitudes by changing laws. The government is likely to be unable to tell people
how to think or whom to invite to parties, even through drastic legal change.
C. Attitudes Toward Debt in Continental Europe: Do the Laws Reflect Them?
Henry Kissinger once said, “when I want to talk to Europe, I don’t know who to
call.”227 While this may be changing, now that the European Union is working on
unifying currency and laws, Europe still consists of many diverse cultures, has a huge
variety of insolvency systems, and a host of diverging philosophies about debt.228
As a rule, financial failure on the continent carries significantly more stigma than in the
common law countries, and the personal bankruptcy laws are less forgiving than those in
the common law countries.229 Reorganization laws are far more varied and reflect other
societal concerns.230 European governments are attempting to reduce the negative stigma
associated with business failure in order to fuel entrepreneurial spirit.231 Many countries,
as well as lawmakers of the newly formed European Union, are looking to the U.S. for
ideas.232
1. Continental Credit Use and Personal Bankruptcy Systems
Personal bankruptcy systems on the continent vary significantly, but have become
far more forgiving in the past decade, following the deregulation of consumer credit.
While credit, particularly consumer credit, is on the rise on the continent, it is still light
years behind that in the U.S. and England.233 Savings rates on the continent are declining
as well.234 Socially-minded European governments have expressed concern over both the
increase in credit use and the reduction in savings rates.235 As a result, some have simply
225

The U.S. did away with the word “bankrupt” in the 1978 Code, replacing it with the more genteel
“debtor,” exactly because “bankrupt” carried such negative stigma. See 11 U.S.C. § 101. This was done to
attempt to stop citizens from being prejudiced toward bankruptcy debtors.
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2002, 2002 WL 24141004.
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See infra notes 262-302 and accompanying text.
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Paul Mizen, (paper published by the Experian Cenrtre for Economic Modeling, School of Economics,
University of Nottingham), at http://nottingham.ac.uk/eco, visited on March 3, 2004. European Credit
Research Institute, ECRI Research Report Number 1, Consumer Credit in the European Union, at 16-18,
hppt://www.ecri.be/pubs/ECRIen, visited on March 2, 2004.
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Metzger & Bufford, supra note 4, at 153.
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See Mizen, supra note 231, at 16.
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See id. France’s savings rate increased a bit to 15.6%, while all other countries’ rates dropped, and with
one country, Denmark, dropping even to U.S. levels. See id at 2.
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Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on Consumer Debt, hosted by National Social Service
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Debt Problems In Changing Europe, at 9, http://news.bbcco.uk/2/hi/business, visited on February 24, 2003.
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stepped up efforts to educate the public about the hazards of credit use.236 Others have
liberalized bankruptcy and discharge laws, in order to ensure that social problems aren’t
exacerbated by the increases in credit.237
Not all European countries have forgiving bankruptcy systems, however, and
some have no systems for consumers at all. 238 For example, in the bankruptcy-restrictive
countries of Italy, France239 and Greece,240 individuals are not eligible for bankruptcy
protection unless they are engaged in business.241 In other words, there simply is no
Here in Ireland, with our booming economy, and our young, vibrant population, the conditions are
ripe for an expansion of consumerism, in addition to the already ‘normal’ levels of personal
borrowing that exist in the population. This, in point of fact, is not an undesirable prospect as
consumer demand has, and will continue to, drive economic and employment growth. It will
underpin employment in the service sector and allow large sections of the population to expand
and develop their lifestyles.
However, with all this emphasis on the booming economy, we must remember that the economy is
just a means to an end and not an end in itself. What really matters is the welfare of our people.
Here we must ensure that massive growth in consumer credit does not lead to an equal growth in
consumer debt. People who are living on the margins of poverty must not be the ones to pay for
our consumer boom.
As crises on a global scale are beyond our capacity to resolve, we have to concentrate our energies
on national, local, and personal debt management strategies.
Id. at 9.
236
Id. at 35. The Swedish keynote speaker at the same conference noted that as family debt increases it is
imperative to educate children about debt. See id. at 35 (remarks of Hans Naslund). As the speaker
explained: [b]y strengthening children and young people in their role as consumers, the basis can be laid for
a strong consumer role in adult life with lifestyles that are in harmony with their income.” Id. This
certainly differs from the American model of the “strong consumer.” See supra notes 104-45 and
accompanying text.
237
See Efrat, supra note 16, at 165-66. Professor Efrat hypothesizes that the need for a fresh start policy is
greater in societies where the government does not regulate credit rates or availability, where the
government actively promotes entrepreneurship, where the welfare programs are small, and where private
financial institutions have relatively lax standards for granting credit. See id. He argues that the U.S. fresh
start policy is very justified in this context, and also that more countries should enact more lenient systems
of debt forgiveness as they move toward the U.S. regarding these factors. See id. at 167-68.
238
See Efrat, supra note 3, at 109 n. 16. Under one scholar’s characterization of Continental systems, the
most restrictive or “conservative” camp is comprised of systems that provide no debt forgiveness to
consumers at all. The “moderate” camp is comprised of nations that offer debt forgiveness to financially
distressed consumers, but not as a matter of course, and the least restrictive or “liberal” camp, headed by
the United States, consists of countries that provide a relatively prompt bankruptcy discharge as a matter of
course. See id. at 82-83.
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Oddly, under French law, which is fairly liberal for business debtors, individuals can be discharged only
from mortgage deficiency claims. See Efrat, supra note 3, at 86 (quoting Francoise Domont-Naert, Legal
Response to Problems of Consumer Indebtedness in Europe, in CONSUMER LAW IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY-NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 285, 288 (Iain Ramsay ed., 1997)).
Conceptually, I have always considered France to fall into the most “conservative “ or ‘restrictive” group
because there is no personal bankruptcy discharge at all, except for mortgage deficiency debt (emphasis
added) See id.
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Remarkably, the Greeks use little credit. Greek households are not Overdebted, ATHENS NEWS, March
13, 2003, 2003 WL 2677459.
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See id. at 81; see also Metzger & Bufford, supra note 4, at 154 (1993); Richard L. Bohanon & William
C. Plouffe, Jr., Mongolian Bankruptcy Law: A Comparative Analysis with the American Bankruptcy
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bankruptcy system for consumers. 242 Even for individuals engaged in business, a
discharge is not granted until many years after bankruptcy is declared, and in a handful of
the most restrictive places, no discharge is granted unless creditors are ultimately paid in
full.243 This is certainly an unusual interpretation of a discharge, at least from an
American perspective.244 The underlying theme of bankruptcy in these jurisdictions is
that bankruptcy is a creditor-oriented mechanism and is not designed to serve the
interests of financially distressed consumers.245
The lack of such a system could have grave societal implications in the face of
consumer credit deregulation. In the past, countries without a personal bankruptcy system
generally did not have access to consumer credit. This equilibrium is now out of balance.
Where there is an economy with consumer credit, such as in Italy or France, there is
simply no way out.246 If one gets in trouble with consumer debt, one remains in trouble,
perhaps indefinitely.
Other European countries are more forgiving, providing some form of discharge.
In Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Austria, Germany, France, Spain and Portugal,247
the judge has the discretion to decide whether a discharge is justified.248 While the
particular standard for granting a discharge varies from place to place, the burden is on
the debtor to prove that the discharge is justified in moderate camp jurisdictions.249 In
System, 7 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 6 (1999); Kevin P. Block, Ukranian Bankruptcy Law, 20 LOY.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 97, 99 (1997)
242
In a few of these places, such as Brazil and Venezuela, an individual is only eligible for bankruptcy if he
or she engaged in business activity as a merchant In many of these places there also is little consumer debt
available. Perhaps these laws make sense in their context. See Antonio Mendes, The New Latin American
Debt Regime-A Brief Incursion into Bankruptcy and the Enforcement of Creditor's Rights in Brazil, 16 J.
INT'L L. BUS. 107, 108 (1995). See Efrat, supra note 3, at 84. In the Czech Republic, the debtor must enter
into a settlement agreement with her creditors. See Helmut Gerlach, Bankruptcy in the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland and Section 304 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, Proceedings Ancillary to
Foreign Bankruptcy Proceedings, 22 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 81 (1998). Conversely, Chile and Egypt
offer the debtor no discharge at the conclusion of the proceedings. See also Ricardo Sandoval, Chilean
Legislation and Cross- Border Insolvency, 33 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 557, 577 (1998).
243
See Efrat, supra note 3, at 84-85. Professor Efrat notes that in these conservative nations, bankruptcy is a
creditor-biased mechanism, more akin to a debt-collection proceeding that a debt-forgiveness framework.
Thus, there is no need to discharge the debt. See id. In Italy, for example, discharge is for merchants only
and it takes 5 years to get a discharge, while it takes 10 years in Greece. See also Bankruptcy and a Fresh
Start: Stigma on Failure and Legal Consequences of Bankruptcy, supra note 143, at 335.
244
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code of 1978 allows certain debts to be wholly or partially discharged.
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See id. For example, one source claims that the purpose of Italian bankruptcy law is to “satisfy the
creditors rights and remove the insolvency (sic) company from the market.” See web page of Avvocato
Giorgio Cherbuni, Giorgio.cherbuni@stdiopirola.com, visited on March 17, 2003.
246
Efrat, supra note 3, at 86.
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See id. at 85. This category also includes the Asian countries of India, Pakistan, Japan, Singapore, and
the Philippines, as well as Israel South Africa, Kenya and Uganda.. See id.
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See id. at 87. This attribute has fundamental impact on debtors seeking relief, as they have the burden of
convincing the judge to grant relief. Efrat reports that there are three basic reasons why debtors in this strata
choose not to file for bankruptcy: social stigma, ignorance of debt forgiveness outcome, and the high costs
and unpredictable results associated with convincing a judge. This is an attribute of Indian law as well as
the law of the Philippines, Singapore and Japan, and the African nations listed above. See id.
249
See id.
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many places, the judge may grant a bankruptcy discharge only if the person is unable to
pay the debts.250 For example, in Denmark, the debtor must be hopelessly indebted and
the circumstances must justify granting a discharge.251 In Norway, a debtor must be
permanently unable to pay.252 In Sweden, in order to get a full or partial discharge, the
debtor must affirmatively prove that “the debtor has no hopes of paying his or her debts
in the foreseeable future.”253
Other European laws have other themes. In Austria and Germany, a discharge is
only granted if the debtor abides by a repayment plan over a period of years, similar in
some respects to Chapter 13 under American law.254 In Germany, the debtor must make
an effort to increase his or her income for the benefit of creditors and also must pay over
all seizable income to creditors for seven years.255 Moreover, creditors are only kept at
bay so long as the debtor does not exceed a certain income or asset level,256 a provision
that arguably creates the wrong incentives.
In all the systems discussed in this section, there has been movement toward
liberalizing the laws, though none are as forgiving as that of the U.S., England and the
other common law systems.257 Until recently, it was not clear that the continent needed
forgiving bankruptcy systems, given extensive social systems and fairly rigid
requirements for borrowing.258 Extensive growth in consumer credit, makes such debt
forgiveness necessary, however, particularly in light of existing stigma about financial
failure.259 Fortunately, as a whole European governments seem interested in making
sound public policy and protecting citizens not merely fueling economies for their own
sake.260 Hopefully these concerns will keep credit from proliferating beyond the
respective systems’ ability to address failure in a constructive way. Some countries, such
as Italy and France, have not yet balanced these concerns and may face social problems
as a result. 261
2. European Reorganization Schemes: France and Germany as Examples.
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See id. at 86.
See id. at 103. See also Hans Petter Graver, Consumer Bankruptcy: A Right or a Privilege? The Role of
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(1997).
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As with personal bankruptcy systems, not all continental countries have
reorganization schemes. In fact, until recently, most countries did not have such a
scheme.262 With the fall of communism and Europe’s desire to create a more competitive
market economy, however, reorganization laws have become popular new legislation.
Most of these systems are still very different from the U.S. Chapter 11 model.263 In most
places, there is no “automatic stay” that protects the debtor and its assets upon the
filing.264 Additionally, in most places the debtor must be insolvent in order to apply for
reorganization and also must have some likely chance of success at reorganizing.265 The
stay, if there is one at all, normally kicks in after the court sorts out all these problems
and issues an order declaring the company in bankruptcy or reorganization.266
Under most schemes, the debtor’s management is replaced with the trustee, a
neutral third party who will run the company while it is attempting to restructure, and
who will control the case and the plan proposal process.267 In some reorganization
schemes, secured creditors are not precluded or stayed from gaining possession of their
collateral, and thus can thwart the reorganization process if they wish.268 For example, in
the new European Union Counsel Regulation of Insolvency Proceedings, the secured
party retains the right to dispose of assets and obtain satisfaction from the proceeds of

262

See Martin, supra note 167, at 78.
Id.
264
Id.
265
Id.
266
See id. at 82.
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See, e.g, supra notes 282-315 and infra notes 408-36 and accompanying text.
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Because of this, some scholars consider these composition systems rather than reorganization systems.
Two economists recently completed a study of bankruptcy and insolvency laws and infrastructures around
the world. Clas Wihlborg & Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, Infrastructure Requirements in the Area of
Bankruptcy Law, Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, 281, 281 (2001) (hereafter, “WSG”).
Positing that strong creditor remedies, as well as strong rehabilitation systems, should save more firms,
they compared countries on several considerations, starting with whether a county’s laws could be
considered more debtor friendly or more creditor friendly. See id. at 291. Their study actually purports to
be much broader, studying the economic role of insolvency procedures and their affect on efficient
allocation of resources, economic growth, and the depth and duration of financial strain. See id. at 284.
They defined a creditor orientation as one that recognizes the claims of creditors to a great extent in
insolvency (see id. at 295), and a debtor orientation as one that allows debtors to retain a stake or control in
insolvency, (see id. at 293), although no equity is left in the firm. See id. at 291. They also rated each
country or region’s attitudes toward security, particularly floating liens that create a security interest in all
cash flow generated by a business, and examined the scope of security interests under various countries’
laws. See id. at 294-95. They argued that countries that allow floating liens or charges and that position the
secured creditor’s interests over unsecured claims of labor and the government, for example, should create
more certainty for lenders and thus promote lending and growth. See id. at 295, 307. The authors note that
in Latin America, labor claimants are highly favored, which could explain why there is little lending in
Latin America. On the other hand, the authors acknowledge that the same favoritism toward labor is
present in France, see id. at 301, but there is no dearth of lending there.
Countries found to be very sympathetic to creditor interests in these ways were all the English
common-law countries, including the United States, and Scandinavia. See id. at 296-97. Sympathetic
countries include Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, Scotland and South Africa. Countries hostile
to security on these factors include Belgium, Luxemburg, Greece, Spain, and most of Latin America, See
id. at 300.
263

35

those assets.269 In some countries, labor claims are so strong that they also are not stayed
and can also veto any plan the debtor proposes. 270
Many schemes, like the U.S. scheme, provide that creditors can vote on the plan
of reorganization and thus decide if it should be allowed to reorganize or should instead
be liquidated.271 Many, though not all, countries’ laws also allow the majority to bind the
dissenting minority to the terms of the plan.272 In some places, big institutional creditors,
such as lenders and banks, control the case and essentially decide the business’s fate.273
In most places, secured creditor claims are not changed in either amount or payment
terms, causing one scholar to conclude that these are not really Chapter 11-style
reorganization scheme but rather “composition” plans.274
Compared to American bankruptcy laws, many countries’ laws read like penal
codes. Fraud and criminal activities are discussed at length, leaving one to believe that
there is almost a presumption of criminal activity or fraud when a business fails to pay its
debts.275 Other provisions suggest that limited liability is not as “limited” as it is in the
United States; thus more debts pass through to parents, owners and even mangers.276
Finally, in some countries, if the managers let the company run for longer than is
reasonable without seeking rehabilitation assistance or closing down, the mangers can be
imprisoned for wasting creditors’ assets.277
French reorganization law, at one end of the continuum, is considered the most
“rescue” oriented in the world, even more so than Chapter 11 of the U.S. Code.278 The
goal of the French system is not merely to facilitate reorganization, but to encourage it,
through early interventionist mechanisms that force or strongly encourage businesses to
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seek rehabilitation early enough so businesses and jobs are not lost.279 France has a strong
history of state intervention into corporate affairs, which has carried over into modern
reorganization laws.280 The process favors saving job-generating enterprises at almost
any cost.281
German reorganization law, lies at the other end of the spectrum in some respects.
It now allows for but certainly does not favor the use of a debtor-in-possession. In 1999,
Germany enacted “rescue” legislation, with the stated purpose of promoting
reorganization over liquidation.282 Prior to this time, the only insolvency law used in
Germany was a liquidation statute, the Konkursordnung.283 While another prior law, the
Vergleichsordnung, allowed rehabilitation,284 the concept of reorganizing rather than
liquidating a troubled business had never really been accepted in German culture and thus
the Vergleichsordnung was never used.285 Thus, prior to the adoption of the New
German Insolvency Code (the “InsO”), all businesses were simply liquidated.286 The
presumption in favor of liquidation was so strong that when a team of researchers
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collected data on the effectiveness of rehabilitation systems around the world, no
rehabilitation statistics were available for Germany.287
German lawmakers, if not German society in general, now believe that liquidation
is not the best solution to some industry or business problems.288 The enactment of the
InsO was motivated by recessions and general problems with the economy, as well as the
need to help acclimate and protect Eastern European individuals and businesses, who
have been “overwhelmed by Western consumer standards.” 289 Unlike most parts of the
world, German insolvency cases are presided over by a specialized bankruptcy court.290
In most cases brought under the InsO, a trustee, called an administrator, operates the
debtor’s business, although at least in theory, a debtor-in-possession is possible.291
Reality may operate quite differently, however. Whatever the new Code actually
says about the plan’s possible affect on creditors, creditors - particularly secured creditors
- always have and still do control insolvency proceedings.292 In fact, although the new
Code states that the administrator appointed in each case shall be independent and thus
not biased toward any particular party in the case, prior to the enactment of InsO,293 it
was common for the administrator to be chosen by the lead or primary secured lender in
the case.294 This has not changed under the InsO.295 Thus, despite the technical
requirement of an independent administrator, the main or lead bank can often choose an
administrator who is friendly to its interests.
Additionally, despite clear language in the InsO stating that one purpose of the
InsO is to “reorganize insolvent debtors,” this concept is far from universally accepted.
One scholar wrote after the enactment of the InsO that German insolvency law does not
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favor rehabilitation over liquidation, and leaves that decision squarely in the hands of
creditors.296 Even the explicitly provided for “reorganization” contemplated by the InsO
is not what an American lawyer might picture; this is not a reorganization in which the
business restructures its debts and continues in operation over the long haul. Section 157
of the InsO states that “[a]t the report meeting the creditors’ assembly shall decide
whether the debtor’s enterprise should be closed down or temporarily continued.”297
Thus, a reorganization that leaves a debtor operational on a long-term basis appears
outside the contemplation of this new law.
Finally, the debtor-in-possession provisions in the InsO are also likely to get little
play. The concept of a debtor-in-possession has been criticized and mistrusted by most
of German society for such a long time that it may never be unearthed regardless of what
the law says.298 Professor Paulus tells an amazing story about the Holzman Construction
Company bankruptcy, in which Holzman had the most experienced and well thought-of
insolvency attorney appointed to the board of the company, so that they could go forward
under the best of circumstances with the very first debtor-in possession case under the
new law. 299 The government was so opposed to the concept of a debtor-in possession
that they found a way to bail Holzman out completely so that there would be no
bankruptcy and thus no debtor-in-possession.300
Again, history and culture may be more important in determining how cases are
handled than the actual law. As one scholar notes, people who were accustomed to the
old law are likely to stick to what they have become accustomed to, and act as they
always have, regardless of which law is on the books.301 Thus, two years after the InsO
went into effect, the new law is still widely objected to, if not entirely ignored.302
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3. Conclusions About European Bankruptcy Laws and Culture
While one might predict that personal bankruptcy would carry more stigma than
business bankruptcy in most of continental Europe, particularly since some countries do
not permit a discharge for people who are just consumers, the line between individual
financial failures and business ones is blurred on the continent. Failure is failure pure and
simple and the stigma is significant.303
Until recently, there was little consumer credit, and thus little need for a consumer
bankruptcy system. This is all about to change as consumer credit becomes widely
available to a huge percentage of the population over the next decade. This could leave
many societies with excessive debt and no way to discharge it. Even if discharge systems
are enacted, societal views about debt may keep them from being used. In many failed
businesses throughout Europe, including The U.K., the stigma is so pronounced that
executives and even employees and suppliers often disappear entirely.304
On the business side, European governments are already doing all that they can to
enact rescue-style reorganization systems, in order to allow more failing businesses to
survive in troubled times.305 As an official European Union source stated:
Europe must re-examine its attitudes toward risk, reward and failure. Thus,
enterprise policy must encourage policy initiatives that reward those who take
risks. Europe is often reluctant to give a second chance to those entrepreneurs
who failed. Enterprise policy will examine the conditions under which failure
303
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could acquire a less negative connotation and it could be acceptable to try again.
It will encourage member states to review bankruptcy legislation to encourage
risk-taking.306
A recent European Union (“EU”) study examined stigma and financial failure in the
fifteen EU member states as well as the United States to determine how to reduce stigma
about financial failure, for the benefit of the overall EU economy.307 Given the extent of
the negative stigma, the study concluded that even if domestic legislators adopt laws that
promote a fresh start, “there is a need to introduce a European cultural campaign
promoting the fresh start….”308
Yet Europeans appear conflicted on whether to actually promote a fresh start.
This study, as well as numerous other sources, focuses extensively on separating the
fraudulent from the non-fraudulent debtors, and providing rehabilitation rights only for
the worthy.309 There is no indication, however, that fraud will be a problem.310 While the
goals of the E.U. in modernizing and liberalizing the insolvency laws of member
countries seem sensible, it is unclear whether this will work. Long- held and strong
cultural values may stand in the way, despite the best intentions of lawmakers. This has
clearly been an impediment in Germany where rescue culture has not been accepted in
society. In France, by comparison, where rescue culture is entirely consistent with longheld beliefs about the importance of saving jobs, rescue culture and business
reorganization has been well accepted and frequently utilized.311
E. East Asian Bankruptcy Law and Culture: A Different World
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Of all of the East Asian countries, Japan has borrowed the most from American
bankruptcy systems and also has developed the most complex bankruptcy systems.312 Its
systems are thus discussed below in some detail. To a large extent, Japan’s attempted
transplantations have failed to overcome strong cultural attitudes against bankruptcy.313
Hong Kong is less traditional and could probably accept modern bankruptcy laws much
more readily.314 Ironically, it has not modernized its business bankruptcy laws, due to its
own unique cultural concerns.315 China’s proposed bankruptcy laws also borrow
significantly from American systems.316 These laws are far more lenient about business
failure than existing Chinese laws.317 Given China’s traditionally communist economy, it
faces unique challenges as it attempts to adopt bankruptcy laws that will promote a
market-based economy.318 Given strong cultural beliefs that bankruptcy is bad luck and
will follow a family forever,319 China may face problems similar to those of Japan in
gaining acceptance of more lenient bankruptcy laws.
1. Japanese Bankruptcy Law and Culture.
In the past few years, Japanese spending habits, as well as Japanese bankruptcy
and insolvency laws, have gradually become more similar to their U.S. counterparts.320
Drastic measures have been taken to promote business rehabilitation in order to aid
Japan’s ailing economy.321 Personal bankruptcy has also become more accessible.322
These are necessary developments, given that credit has recently become more available
to the Japanese, which has in turn increased borrowing.323 Yet the Japanese avoid using
these initiatives for cultural reasons.324
A. Law and Japanese Culture
Western legal notions are unfamiliar to the Japanese mind, heart, and soul.
Traditional Japanese culture emphasizes the group over the individual, similarity over
difference.325 Thus, the Japanese feel that it is embarrassing and shameful to need to
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resort to the law.326 In fact, the Japanese believe that everyone would be better off if
there was no law, and no need for the law.327 Naturally, then, use of the court system is
viewed as a last resort. Informal mediation and negotiation is encouraged and used
primarily for dispute resolution. 328 If these tactics fail and formal proceedings are
necessary, it is assumed that both parties will neither win nor lose.329 The objective of
the court system is not to declare a winner or loser, but rather to construct a harmonious
compromise for both parties.330
Japanese culture has often been referred to as a culture of shame.331 This
characterization encompasses everything from the adverse attitude toward the need for
laws to suicide over debts and economic failure.332 In the 1990’s, a new element was
added into the mix of Japanese culture. The government and aristocracy began a
campaign of kokusaika, meaning the internationalization of Japanese style and culture.333
This trend introduced more foreign influences into Japan than ever before.334 Yet cultural
trends of other countries are never fully integrated into the cultural fabric of Japan.335
Instead, they maintain their “foreignness” and are even thought of as elite, exotic and
cosmopolitan.336
With the modern trend of globalizing culture and business, Japan began in early
2001 to reform its bankruptcy laws. In the past, bankruptcy proceedings in Japan have
taken place only after an extensive and informal process of confidential discussions with
the court as to reorganization without insolvency.337 This included informal contact with
creditors.338 The emphasis of these informal discussions was on rescue, not through any
“formal legal process . . .[or] the application of an insolvency law.”339 Unfortunately for
the individual or individuals at the head of a financially troubled business, the culture of
shame that pervades Japan makes bankruptcy a personal failure, not a business failure.340
This characterization of bankruptcy in Japan often leads to tragedy for the individual, be
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it suicide or isolation from family and community.341 Bankruptcy is a type of devastation
not unlike “sickness, shipwrecks, fires, painful childbirth, and other vicissitudes.”342
The reluctance of the Japanese to use the new formal insolvency law and their
propensity for the more informal discussion is firmly rooted in the negative Japanese
attitude towards law.343 As law and ethics are inseparable to the Japanese, a contract
breach or a formal bankruptcy proceeding are as personal as character flaws.344 Rather
than a legal system of rights and duties, the Japanese follow the concept of giri345. Giri is
loosely translated to mean “a duty or the state of a person who is bound to behave in a
prescribed way toward a certain other person.” 346 Obligation of fulfillment of giri is not
legally enforced, but socially and culturally enforced as part of personal honor.347 Again,
the idea of shame or guilt attached to behaving in a way that is contrary to giri builds the
foundation of law and society in Japan.348 The well-known Japanese notion of “losing or
saving face” also flows from the concept of giri.349 Following giri is thought to be
intuitive, not learned, and therefore formal rules of law are resisted by the Japanese as
counter-intuitive.350 Lawyers themselves appear to play a different role in Japan than in
the West, as the word lawyer in Japanese, bengoshi, translates loosely as mediator rather
than litigator.351 The law itself is analogized to a sacred sword – it is displayed but
preferably never used.352
B. Japan’s Economy and Spending Habits
While some Americans stereotype the Japanese as profligate spenders,353 in
reality the Japanese are among the biggest savers in the world.354 Japan’s economy, the
341
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second largest in the world, began to fail in the early nineties because of overall business
failure that in turn threatened the entire banking system.355 This was caused in large part
because the Japanese traditionally prefer saving over spending and have refused to buy
commensurate with Japan’s growing economy.356 The Japanese government begged
citizens to spend money to fuel their crashing economy.357 Unlike Americans, who were
too happy to oblige when asked to do the same after September 11, the Japanese refused.
As a group, they are less willing to spend, particularly in tough economic times marked
by industry failures and job loss.358
Like the American spending habits discussed previously, these habits were
created through historical events.359 After World War II, Japan built its economy on
standardized mass production.360 This was wildly successful, creating a large trade
surplus with the United States, the world’s largest consumer, and creating a large middle
class.361 Japan’s success in this area caused it to enter the stock or “value “ market very
late, and probably to enter this area too quickly, without public understanding or support
of the financial industries upon which the value market is based.362 This created a
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“bubble economy”363 which burst in the nineties, and the effects of which are still felt
today.364 In 2001, Japan announced that it was in its first deflationary economy in
history.365
This trend may be changing however, particularly in the area of credit card use.
The Japanese currently carry much more cash than Americans and do not use credit cards
nearly as extensively.366 Additionally, while about half of all Americans carry a balance
on their credit cards, only about 10% of the Japanese do so. 367 This is in part because
most Japanese cards are not set up for this type of use. In most cases, the Japanese are
required to decide at the checkout counter if they want to pay off the item in one billing
cycle or carry the debt for a longer period.368 Recently, a new product was made available
to the Japanese that did not require this up-front decision and disclosure, and thus
allowed the customer to decide later if he or she wanted to pay off the item or carry it as a
balance.369 This financial product has been very successful for the issuers because a
shocking 90% of the items purchased on these cards have not been paid off in a cycle but
instead carried as revolving credit. 370 At least one scholar predicts that the use of
revolving credit is likely to increase drastically as a result of the availability of this
product.371
Despite the past unwillingness of individuals to spend, Japanese businesses spent
and borrowed extensively. Due to the lack of profits, and extremely lax banking
regulations and borrowing requirements, many businesses are failing. After a record
companies like Microsoft, Intel, and Cisco Systems were developing new ways to store information and
exchange data, Japanese businesses remained focused on producing consumer goods.
363
See id. A clear example of a bubble economy comes from the dot.com mid-1990s, where the natural
price of a company’s stock and the artificial selling price differed significantly. Thus, in this short time, a
large spike or bubble would occur, until it ultimately burst based on the artificial valuations which had
previously propped it up. Japan suffered from various bubbles. Its investors were buying up stocks at
inflated prices not because they expected a solid dividend return but because they expected further gains in
the value, not unlike the American investing public who funneled millions to companies who could never
provide investors with dividends, but whose stock was valued based on speculation. What’s more, Japan’s
real estate prices were so out of line that at one time the land beneath the Emperor's Palace in Tokyo was
considered more valuable than all of California. Finally, Japan imposed a monetary policy that forced the
rate of interest to deviate from a natural rate generated by the supply and demand for saving. Jennifer
McNulty, http://www.ucsc.edu/oncampus/currents/97-10-13/hutchison.htm, visited on March 2, 2004.
364
See McNulty, supra note 363.
365
See id. Many businesses continue to fail because of this stagnant economy. The most common reason
for this continuing problem seems to be the public’s relentless unwillingness to spend. Even at interest
rates of less than one percent, the Japanese people do not want to borrow money. They continue to oversave and under-spend which stops growth and investment in private industry. See Angell, supra note 357.
This has also caused the yen to fall as against the dollar as people prefer to save in the stable dollar, further
exacerbating the problem. Id.
366
See Mann, supra note 100, at 1056.
367
See id. at 1057.
368
See id. at 1074. Carrying a balance involves telling the sales clerk that the item will not be paid for
immediately, a step many Japanese are unwilling to take for smaller purchase and even many larger
purchases. See id. In reality, then, most Japanese credit cards have been used like an American debit card.
369
See id.
370
See id. at 1080.
371
See id.
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number of corporate bankruptcies,372 in 1996, the government embraced rescue culture
with a vengeance, starting a rapid initiative to revamp business reorganization laws to
make it easier to reorganize and keep a company from folding.373 The government
planned to unfold a new reorganization law for smaller businesses in 2001, but as the
economy continued to flag, it stepped up efforts and actually finalized and passed the
new reorganization law ahead of schedule.374
B. Personal Bankruptcy in Japan
As in many other parts of the world, bankruptcy was not initially available to
individuals in Japan but only to merchants. 375 Eventually, a personal bankruptcy system
was enacted, that could be used by any natural person, whether a merchant or not. 376
From the beginning, creditors in Japan had the right to decide whether to allow a
merchant to stay in business or to liquidate his business.377 Today individuals are able to
obtain a discharge fairly routinely, causing at least one scholar to conclude that Japanese
personal bankruptcy law is not drastically different than in the U.S.378 In many ways,
however, Japanese bankruptcy law is stricter than American law. A bankruptcy case can
be maintained only if the debtor is unable to pay debts as they become due. 379 Moreover
the discharge is not automatic but must be applied for. 380 In addition, it takes ten full
372

Angell, supra note 357.
The theory of changing the law was that if these companies could pay back their debts, rather than just
ceasing operations, this might save the failing banks and the entire system.
374
See infra notes 482-511 and accompanying text.
375
Matthew Bender, Doing Business in Japan, 5-XIV-7-DBJAPAN § 7.01 (2001)(hereinafter “Doing
Business in Japan”). The system that was in place was simply a private agreement (kashi bunsan) between
the obligor and his creditors. The obligor was a social outcast, and not worthy of the usual social
considerations due to a member of society. Private agreements began in the 1600’s and continued until
1867.
376
Doing Business in Japan, supra note 375, at. §7.02, (2001); Bankruptcy Act, Arts. 5, 12, 31, 33,34, 4244, 80-82.
377
Id.
378
See Mann, supra note 10o, at 1084-85.
379
See Doing Business in Japan, supra note 375, at §7.02.
379
Japanese law focuses on the civil law approach of accentuating the debtor’s insolvency to justify
bankruptcy proceedings. Currently Japanese law recognizes three bankruptcy causes: shiharai-funC
(Insolvency), shiharai-teishi (suspension of payments), and saimu-chCka (liabilities exceed assets). When
the petition is filed with the clerk the court does not confirm that there is in fact a “cause” that would
support the petition. The obligor can rebut each type of “cause” if they do not want the bankruptcy
adjudicated. For a more in depth overview of how Japanese Bankruptcy law operates and treats
adjudication of Bankruptcy status see Insolvency Overview-Japan: The World Bank,
http://Gild%20G%20User:password@wbln0018.worldbank.org/legal/gild/Home/Japan.nsf/lates, last
visited May 30, 2003; see also Shinchiro Abe, Recent Developments of Insolvency Laws and Cross-Border
Practices in the United States and Japan, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 47, 49-51 (2002). As in the United
States, a trustee is appointed to take over all non-exempt assets. Id. As in the United States, a trustee is
appointed to take over all non-exempt assets. See Civil Execution Act, (Minhi ShikkC HC, Law No. 4,
1979), Arts. 131. 132. 152., 153., cited in Doing Business in Japan, supra note 375, at § 7.06[1]. As in the
United States, a trustee is appointed to take over all non-exempt assets. Id.
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See Efrat, supra note 3, at 102. It will be granted, in the judge’s discretion, only if the judge finds that
the debtor is honest and unable to pay his or her debts. See id; see also Report on Bankruptcy Law and the
Trend of Consumer Bankruptcy in Japan from Takashi Yoshida, Primus Financial Services, Japan, to
373
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years to get the discharge, during which time the debtor is forbidden from many business
activities, including being a director of a corporation or a kabushiki kaishi. 381
Personal bankruptcy is rare in Japan, with just .7 filings per 1,000 residents in
2000, compared to 5.2 filings per 1,000 residents in the U.S.382 This is not surprising,
given the spending habits of the Japanese,383 as well as the societal stigma assigned to
such behavior. The social implications arising out of the bunsan, or customary law of
insolvency, are clear from the expression chawah hitotsu ni hashi ichizen, which literally
means “one rice bowl and one pair of chopsticks.” 384 The phrase refers to the full
exemptions to which a debtor was entitled under customary law,385 and suggests that a
person who has filed for bankruptcy is entitled to virtually nothing, and is “a disgraced
person no longer worthy of the usual social consideration due a member of society.”386
C. Japanese Reorganization Laws
Japan has a number of reorganization systems, and they are not mutually
exclusive.387 This complex system includes the prior Composition Act,388 the Corporate
Reorganization Act, 389 and the recently enacted Civil Rehabilitation Act (the “CRA”).390
Japan’s Commercial Code also provides for an out-of-court workout procedure known as
a “Corporate Arrangement.”391 While the Corporate Reorganization Act was designed for
large publicly traded companies, and while the Composition Act is roughly the
predecessor for the new CRA for small business reorganizations,392 a company needn’t

Elizabeth Bobenmoyer, FORD FINANCIAL 1, Nov. 27, 2001. Grounds for denial of a discharge include
fraudulent conveyances prior to the case, making false statements to the court. See CRA art. 366-69.
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383
See infra notes 353-74 and accompanying text.
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See Doing Business in Japan, supra note 375, at §7.08.
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See id.
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See id.
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See Shinichiro Abe, The Japanese Corporate Reorganization Reform Law of 2002, 22 AMER. BANKR.
INST. J. 36, 36 (2003); Kent Anderson, Small Business Reorganizations: An Examination of Japan’s Civil
rehabilitation Act Considering U.S. Policy Implications and Foreign Creditors’ Practical Interests, 75
AMER. BANKR. L.J. 355, 360 (2001).
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See id. at n. 6, citing Wagi ho (the “Composition Act”). This was the reorganization law most often used
before the recent enactment of the Civil Rehabilitation Act, Law No. 225, Dec. 14, 1999 (the CRA”). For
the statistical figures, see Anderson, supra note 387, at 360, citing 1 Saiko Saibansho Jimu Somukyoku
[Supreme Court General Secretariat], SHIHO TOKEI NENPO, Minji hen (Annual Report of judicial
statistics, Civil and administrative cases volume) (1990-1999).
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See Kaisha kosei ho (the “Corporate reorganization Act”). The Corporate Reorganization Act has been
described as a rigid and unforgiving process designed for the rehabilitation of large publicly-held
corporations. See Theodore Eisenberg & Shoichi Tagashira, Should We Abolish Chapter 11: The Evidence
From Japan, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 111,114 (1994).
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See Minji saisei ho (the “Civil Rehabilitation Act) (the “CRA”), Law No. 225, Dec. 14, 1999.
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See Shinichiro, supra note 387, at 36. This is essentially an out-of-court, private work-out arrangement.
Because it requires the approval of all creditors to the proposed work-out plan, it has not been used much.
Id.
392
See Anderson, supra note 387, at 360-61 (stating that the CRA is best seen as an extension or revision of
the Composition Act).

48

be large to use the Corporate Rehabilitation Act, nor small to use the CRA.393 In fact,
Japan’s massive Sogo Department Store recently filed a case under the CRA, probably
because it is simply more debtor friendly and easier to use than the Corporate
Rehabilitation Act.394
Compared to both the Composition Act and the Corporate Reorganization Act, the
CRA was a radical departure from existing law.395 It was the first debtor-in-possession
system in Japan and was far less rigid than other existing systems.396 Unlike virtually all
other schemes in existence at the time, outside the U.S.,397 the CRA does not contain an
insolvency requirement.398 Like most other systems, a case will only be accepted if there
is a chance of reorganization.399
In theory, the business is run by a debtor-in-possession under the CRA.400 The
extent to which the company is actually run by a debtor-in-possession, however, varies
from district to district.401 In the Osaka and Sapporo districts, courts usually follow an
American-style reorganization scheme, leaving the debtor-in-possession in place and
appointing no overseers.402 In Tokyo, however, the courts generally follow the old
Composition system and appoint a supervisor in every case.403 In Nagoya, the courts
seem to follow the English system and appoint examiners, including business
393

See Anderson, supra note 387, at 363-64.
See id. The Corporate Reorganization Act had yet to be modernized when the CRA was enacted, making
the CRA as the most recent policy statement about business reorganization policy in Japan.
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See id.
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See id Unlike the Composition Act, the CRA allows a business to file its petition for reorganization
before a plan is submitted. CRA, art. 21(2).
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France also has no insolvency requirement. See Views from the Bench, supra note 6, at 560.
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See CRA, art. 21. Now a mere apprehension of either balance sheet or equitable insolvency is sufficient
to allow one to file a successful petition. See id .The reason for the change was that the drafters wanted to
avoid an insolvency requirement that could make it too late to rehabilitate. See Anderson, supra note 387,
at 364.
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See CRA, art. 33, 21(1). There must be a chance that the plan will actually be approved and a showing
of good faith. See id There is a time limit for filing a plan but it is not a rigid one. See Anderson, supra
note 480, at 391. Unlike the Composition Act, which requires a plan at filing, “the regulations
accompanying the CRA provide that, unless special circumstances exist otherwise, a plan should be filed
within two months of the deadline for submissions of proof of claim, that claims deadline generally being
between two and four weeks after commencement. CRA art. 84, 18(1), (emphasis added). Furthermore, it
is the court that determines the time frame for submitting a plan. “Debtor shall prepare and submit to the
court a draft rehabilitation plan within the period stipulated by the court” see Anderson, supra note 387, at
391, citing CRA, art. 163 (1).
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supervisors, examiners, trustees, receivers, representative officers, and creditors’ committees. See
Anderson, supra note 387, at 373-79 (describing the role of each of these professionals in detail).
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See id. at 373.
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do specific acts, as determined by the court, without the consent of the supervisor, CRA art. 54. The
supervisor has two affirmative powers: 1) the court can grant a supervisor a right of avoidance to challenge
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professionals such as accountants to run the company in every case.404 Needless to say,
there is still ambivalence in Japan about the concept of a debtor-in-possession, but this
was a tremendous step toward embracing the debtor-in-possession concept.
Not long after the CRA was passed, the Corporate Reorganization Act was
amended to make it more user-friendly as well.405 The most radical thing about the new
Corporate Reorganization Act is that it binds both secured and unsecured creditors.406
Because of a strong belief in betsujo ken, or the right of separation for secured creditors,
no prior Japanese bankruptcy or insolvency law ever affected the rights of secured
parties.407 Even the new CRA does not affect the rights of secured creditors, 408 though it
does allow debtors to reduce the debt owed on property by essentially paying its value
into the court and thus wiping out the secured party’s security interest in that particular
item.409
The passage of the CRA, as well as the recent amendments to the Corporate
Reorganization Act, appear to be a successful attempt at liberalizing the laws in order to
promote rehabilitation. Having said that, one would assume that Japanese society now
404

See id. The powers of the examiner is not as far reaching as the supervisor in that the examiner does not
have the subpoena and avoidance powers. However, the examiner is capable of examining the debtor (CRA
at. 62). The major duty of the examiner is to provide a report to the court in a stipulated time (CRA art.
62).
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See Shinichiro, supra note 387, at 36. The amendments to the Corporate Reorganization Act went into
effect on April 1, 2003. Id.
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Id.
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See CRA, art. 51; Tasuka Matsue, Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization, in Doing Business in
Japan, supra note 375, at §§ 7.22 through 7.24 (Zentaro Kitagara rev.ed. 1999), cited in Anderson, supra
note 387, at 380. However, the CRA does provide that a court can temporarily limit a secured creditor’s
right to sell a debtor’s property at judicial sale, if the debtor applies for such an order, pays the creditors
potential costs up front, proves that the delay will not hurt the creditor, and also proves that the stay of such
action is in the best interests of creditors. CRA art. 31(1)(2).
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The debtor has the burden of proving all of these things, unlike under Section 362 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, in which the debtor gets an automatic stay and the creditor must prove a host of facts in
order to get the stay lifted. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1)&(2). The narrowness of this exception demonstrates
the powers of secured creditors in reorganization cases generally, including cases instituted under the CRA.
409
CRA, art. 148(1). This essentially amounts to a redemption under American bankruptcy law, see 11
U.S.C. § 722, and is always permitted in a Chapter 11 as well as a Chapter 7. Unfortunately, most
American debtors, and, I suspect, Japanese debtors, do not have the cash to actually buy out the secured
party’s interest in such collateral in most cases. While this is not a drastic displacement of the secured
party’s rights by American standards, and probably of little use to a cash-poor debtor, it is the first example
in Japanese history of reducing a secured party’s claim in a bankruptcy case. See Anderson, supra note
480, at 384. This provision could be useful in Japan’s current deflationary and stagnant economy, where
many types of collateral have not held their value. If nothing else, the provision may provide leverage - for
the first time - against the secured party within a bankruptcy case. See id.
The amendments to the Corporate Reorganization Act made the process far simpler overall than it
once was. See Shinichiro, supra note 387, at 36 (stating that it was used between 4 and 57 times per year
during the past 20 years). The bankruptcy court need not find that a company has a prospect of
reorganization under the new Corporate Reorganization, which is more favorable to debtors than the CRA,
and which may facilitate earlier filings. The Corporate Reorganization Act also gives better protection for
post-petition claims, thus promoting post-petition financing. See id. at 37. Finally, while the Corporate
Reorganization Act is not a debtor-in-possession system per se, it does allow the court to appoint members
of the debtor’s management as the trustee.
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accepts business failure as part of life in Japan. This does not appear to be the case.
Bankruptcy of any kind is still a major embarrassment. The government has recently
gone so far as to promote the use of the CRA in a prime-time television show describing
its many positive uses and attributes,410 which itself demonstrates society’s resistance to
this idea.
D. When Law and Culture Clash: Debt and Suicide.
At a time when the Japanese government is doing everything it can to reduce the
stigma associated with financial failure, Japanese consumers finally appear to be
loosening up and spending more. The use of revolving consumer credit appears to be on
the rise, which may help fuel the economy. It also may result in more financial failure for
consumers, which could actually cause more social problems.
Despite more consumer credit in the system, the Japanese have not relaxed their
views on financial failure, for either businesses or consumers. Despite the huge amount
of debt companies have taken out recently, stigma over a failed business is higher in
Japan than virtually anywhere else in the world. Executives of failed companies in Japan
often do more than disappear. Financial failure is the ultimate societal disgrace and
suicide is a common way out.411 As higher consumer debt levels become more common,
failures will increase and so may suicide rates. It is unclear whether merely liberalizing
laws can stem this tide.412
Japanese culture is complicated with many unspoken rules and hierarchies.413
People have the expectation of being in the same job for life and cannot face job lose
without losing face.414 Yet saving face is the ultimate societal necessity. Neither law nor
410

Anderson, supra note 387, at 363. It is hard to imagine the U.S. government doing such a show to
promote the use of Chapter 11, but the Japanese economy is in deep trouble.
There also may be different cultural views on what makes for good advertising. I remember a
government campaign in Singapore, designed to stem the negative population growth in that country. The
government took out full-sized billboards all over town, proclaiming that “life without children is dull.”
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See Francoise Kadri, Millions of Ordinary Japanese on Brink of Financial Ruin as Debts Mount,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESS, March 24, 2002, 2002 WL 2369590. Suicide is tied directly to financial failure,
and few people know that they can file for bankruptcy instead. See also Gautaman Bhaskaran, Suicide
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ones word at all costs, as a way of saving face. Davangshu Datta, Uncertain Times, THE BS WEEKEND,
October 26, 2002, 2002 WL 100052313.
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Milhaupt, supra note 273, at 434-35.
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See Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Relational Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance: Contract, Culture,
and the Law, 37 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 3, 4 (1996).
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propaganda may be capable of changing these views. In most parts of Asia, including
Japan, informal agreements are as enforceable as formal ones, if not more so. 415 Explicit
insolvency laws, like explicit contract laws, and explicit corporate and securities law,
play a far smaller role than in the Western world than they do in Japan.416 Informal
insolvency procedures are often preferred to formal systems because the formal rules
often conflict with the value systems of the society.417 Thus, simply changing the laws
will not necessarily change financial and legal practices, or attitudes toward financial
failure.
2. Lesson from Hong Kong and China
Neither Hong Kong nor China has developed bankruptcy systems as elaborate as
the Japanese bankruptcy laws.418 Hong Kong has a modern individual bankruptcy law,
but does not have a business reorganization system.419 China has no personal bankruptcy
system but is developing a rescue system for ailing businesses.420 As is the case in Japan,
cultural issues may keep the Chinese from using these new laws.421
1. Hong Kong Bankruptcy Law and Culture
As one would expect from an English colony, Hong Kong’s Insolvency Laws
have always looked somewhat similar to those of the United Kingdom.422 What is harder
to anticipate is that Hong Kong still has no corporate reorganization process, and has
taken few steps to modernize its business bankruptcy laws. Hong Kong’s current
insolvency laws are based loosely on law from the United Kingdom that dates back to
1929.423 Not surprisingly, these laws are archaic, harsh and pro-creditor.424
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Proposed changes to the Hong Kong Insolvency laws, dealing with corporate or
business reorganization, have failed to pass.425 Liquidation, which is referred to as
“insolvency,” is the only option for corporations.426 For almost a decade, scholars and
legislators have been attempting to pass corporate rescue regime in Hong Kong, to no
avail.427 The scheme, named “provisional supervision,” was originally drafted to operate
much like an English “Administration.” Under a provisional supervision, a specialist or
trustee runs the company and proposes a voluntary arrangement, which creditors vote
upon within six months.428 As in an English Administration, creditors control the
proceeding.429 None of the drafts of the yet-to-be-passed provision supervision
contemplate a debtor-in-possession system.430
The first drafts of the new procedure were vehemently opposed by labor groups,
who currently receive the first dollars out of a liquidating company under the liquidation
procedure set out in section 166 of the Companies Ordinance.431 These groups feared
that the new provision supervision would be less favorable to their interest and thus
opposed the bill.432 Thereafter, in order to appease these interests, the draft law was
changed to require any company in provisional supervision to pay off in full, in advance,
all wage claims and severance payments for all workers laid off in the past, or to be laid
off in the future, in the context of the reorganization.433 Many scholars and legislators
see this requirement, which is still contained in the current proposed draft bill, as a major
obstacle to successful rehabilitation, or even attempted rehabilitation.434
Another sticking point in the current legislation has been the treatment of secured
creditors. In earlier drafts, secured creditors voted with all other creditors on the
arrangement and thus could be forced to accept a plan they did not like, and could lose
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the benefit of their superior position in their collateral. 435 While the current draft no
longer contains these disadvantageous provisions, the pendulum may now have shifted
too far in the secured creditor’s favor.436 Secured creditors holding a security interest in
all or substantially all of a debtor’s assets now have veto power over the provisional
supervision and can, for 4-7 working days following a petition, terminate the provisional
supervision completely.437 None of this has become law, however, so all provisions are
still up for grabs. Moreover, Hong Kong has a long history of handling insolvency and
financial distress through informal means, such as out-of-court workouts, and this trend is
likely to continue whether the provisional supervision passes or not.
While business bankruptcy law in Hong Kong has not been modernized, the
bankruptcy process for individual debtors, which is called “bankruptcy,” has been relaxed
and modernized.438 In the past, due to the discretionary discharge provisions, many
debtors received no discharge and the quickest one could obtain a discharge was eight
years.439 For example, for the ten-year period from 1983 through 1992, 2,400 people
field for personal bankruptcy in Hong Kong and only 25 received a bankruptcy
discharge.440 In effect, the discretionary discharge made bankruptcy a life sentence for
most.441 During the post-filing period and before a discharge, a debtor cannot obtain
additional credit. Effective April 1, 1998, many if not most individual debtors can obtain
a discharge within four years.442
Unlike some parts of East Asia, Hong Kong citizens have not been afraid to
exercise their bankruptcy rights.443 In November of 2003, there were 939 bankruptcies in
the City of Hong Kong.444 There were 1,417 during October of the same year.445 These
numbers show that filings were down from the prior year, when there were 2,441 in
November of 2002, and 3,193 in January of 2003.446 These numbers are astronomical
compared to the ten years prior to this time, showing an increase in filings of over
1,000%.447 While some of this increase can be attributed to liberalization of the
individual bankruptcy discharge, increases in consumer credit, particularly credit cards,
435
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may also explain these increases.448 As of September of 2002, there were nearly 7
million residents of Hong Kong, and 9.38 million credit cards in circulation.449
Culture appears to play a much smaller role in Hong Kong’s attitudes towards
bankruptcy, especially compared to China.450 Because Hong Kong laws are based on
English law, the law lacks local culture elements unique to Hong Kong.451 Although there
are remnants of Chinese ideals in Hong Kong, such as the desire to pay creditors out of
moral obligation, these Chinese traditions are diminishing due to the transient nature of
Hong Kong’s population. 452 Moreover, most bankruptcies in Hong Kong involve foreign
companies rather than purely Chinese ones. Assets in Hong Kong tend to be people
rather than large capital assets, and money goes in and out of Hong Kong quickly,
requiring quick court action in bankruptcy cases. 453
Not surprisingly, then, filing for bankruptcy in Hong Kong does not carry as
much stigma as in many other Asian countries, in part because Hong Kong’s community
is internationally- oriented and transient.454 Some large bankruptcies in the 1980’s made
the idea more common, and therefore more acceptable.455 Among the traditional Chinese
people who live in Hong Kong, the stigma is still present, and bankruptcies from Chinese
owned business are rare. 456
Like the mainland Chinese, Hong Kong citizens would rather avoid courts,
preferring to work things out on their own.457 The robust Hong Kong economy also has
made bankruptcy reform less of a necessity.458 When businesses do fail, the banks have
been willing to bail many out. Many people believe, however, that reform is badly
needed in Hong Kong.459 Moreover, Hong Kong citizens are more likely to embrace and
use modern bankruptcy laws than the citizens of either China or Japan. Confucianism
448
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and other traditional forces play a smaller role in modern, long-colonized, market-based
Hong Kong.460
3. Chinese Economics, Bankruptcy Law and Culture
Unlike colonized Hong Kong, mainland China has a long history of economic and
social isolation, and a history reaching as far back as 221 B.C., the year it gained its
independence. 461 China is also one of the world’s largest countries by land mass, and is
the world’s most populated country with a population of 1,286,975,468.462 In recent
years, China has undergone a surprising shift from a state controlled economy, to an
economy where a growing percentage of enterprises are privately controlled.463 In fact,
well over half of all China’s businesses are now privately owned. 464
In the past, the communist government of China has fought to limit any capitalist
influence in the economy.465 Now due to a growing realization that capitalism may more
efficiently produce in many sectors than many of the regime’s State Owned Enterprises
(“SOEs”), the Communist Party of China is accepting and even encouraging
capitalism.466
This acceptance of private enterprise did not occur suddenly. Through the
assumption of power of the Communist Party until the 1980’s, the authorities actively
crushed capitalist enclaves.467 In 1982 the government “rehabilitated” capitalist
entrepreneurs in an effort to increase economic activity.”468 At the 16th party congress,
not only were the “red capitalists” invited to join the Communist Party, some private
entrepreneurs were even made delegates.469 The party also vowed to “promote the
healthy development of the non-public sector” and “better safeguard private property.”470
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China’s SOEs are concentrated in heavy industrial operations and have incurred
large debt loads. These industries have been restructured with massive layoffs and
corporate restructuring in an attempt to increase efficiency.471 Restructuring efforts are
yielding limited results. Even with the Chinese government’s doubtful official statistics,
the SOEs losses exceeded profits for the first time in 1996.472 Moreover, China’s state
banks have written off US$15.3 billion in non-performing loans to SOEs.473
Private enterprise is developing rapidly despite a difficult regulatory environment
and continuing government discrimination.474 By 2002, the private sector generated
around 60% of China’s output while using only 20% of the country’s resources. The
SOEs produced only 40% of output while consuming 80% of resources.475 The private
sector is producing eight out of ten new jobs.476 China’s overall economy is growing by
8% and this rate is expected to continue into 2005.477 The Chinese Communist Party is
committed to maintaining this growth over the next two decades and the private sector
will have to play an integral part in this growth.478
Culture plays a substantial role in Chinese laws, especially its bankruptcy laws. 479
Considering its population, China has a low level of reported commercial bankruptcies.480
In Chinese society the notion of bankruptcy has long been condemned as “bad luck”
471
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meaning “broken fortune.”481 If a father owes a debt, his sons or grandsons would be
responsible for it; bankruptcy implies a life of burden for generations to come. 482
The Chinese historically have a low regard or disbelief in judicial power.483
Creditors focus on “guanxi” (relationships) as opposed to their entitlements to
payment.484 As is further discussed below, bankruptcy cases in China have been
controlled by the government not by independent courts, causing citizens to distrust of
the system.485 Confucianism also continues to have great influence on commercial
activities.486 Confucian ethical teachings include the following values which are held in
high respect by the average Chinese person and are visible in Chinese business practices,
and their use of law: “Li,” includes ritual, propriety, etiquette; “Hsiao,” love within the
family, love of parents for their children and of children for their parents; “Yi,”
righteousness; “Xin,” honesty and trustworthiness, “Jen,” benevolence, humaneness
towards others, the highest Confucian virtue; and “Chung,” loyalty to the state.487
Confucianism encourages balance and harmony.488 Unless there is no other choice,
people should keep their friendships and relationships intact, rather than pursuing court
intervention. Under Confucianism it is also “anti-moral” to force a debtor into
involuntary bankruptcy.489
Socialism and communism also have a great affect on attitudes and culture in
China, and the resulting bankruptcy laws.490 The most developed and most significant
Chinese Bankruptcy laws focuses on state owned enterprises (“SOE”).491 It is very
difficult to place a SOE into bankruptcy and government permission is needed.492 SOE’s
are property of the state and bankruptcy is viewed as a leadership failure, a loss of face,
for the government.493 Yet, scores of SOEs operate at a loss.494 Naturally, if a large
pressure on government leaders, second, strong opposition to bankruptcy from banks, and third, an
entrenched “reliance” psychology in society. Id.
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number of SOEs were to be closed down at one time, many people could simultaneously
lose their jobs, and no national provision has yet been enacted to address this problem.495
If SOEs are given free access to bankruptcy, a domino effect is also feared because many
SOEs are deeply indebted to one another.496
Private enterprises are permitted to file a liquidation case, which can later become
a reorganization case, under Chapters 16 and 19 of China’s Civil Procedure Law.497 If
the case is accepted by the court, then a stay of collection efforts goes into effect.498
While all case begin as liquidations, the case can proceed, through the actions of a
Creditors Assembly, the creditors can vote on a reorganization plan, that will be approved
if it is approved by two- thirds of all unsecured creditors.499 Priority treatment is given to
wage claims first, and then to taxes.500
In 1986, China passed a controversial law that permitted the bankruptcy of
SOEs. These cases all start as liquidations but can then become reorganization cases.502
The goal in enacting this new law was to encourage more efficient management of SOEs
and to liquidate unprofitable businesses.503 Lawmakers continue to call for reform of this
law, however, because it leaves the decision about whether a company can file for
bankruptcy in the hands of the government rather than courts or creditors.504 Courts are
still not independent, and the community continues to have a lack of trust for judicial
bodies.505 Moreover, despite the clear purpose of the new law, the government still views
it as a loss of face if an SOE fails, and thus limits access to the new system.506 Clearly,
the desire to compete in a global capital market cannot overcome ancient cultural and
societal beliefs.
501
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passage of its new Civil Rehabilitation Law, one of the few debtor-in--possession
systems on the world. It was enacted ahead of schedule, to try to help breathe life into
Japan’s floundering economy. While it has been used to some extent, the government
would like to see it used much more.507 Shame over debt is still prevalent. With more
debt in the system, a recessionary economy and more business failures, debt-related
suicides have been on the rise. 508 While Japan’s Economy Minister has called for a
change in both laws and attitudes about debt repayment, it is far easier to change the laws
than the attitudes.
As China prepares to approve and unfold its reorganization scheme, it may be
faced with similar problems. The Chinese also consider it a shameful thing to not pay
ones debts, a misfortune that would follow one for the rest of his or her life.509 Culturally,
like the Japanese, the Chinese are taught to value relationships over money and selfpromotion.510
None of the Asian countries discussed have high corporate bankruptcy rates. The
reasons are both cultural and opportunity-driven. Sometimes the law is not helpful.
Much of the time, cultural factors make bankruptcy taboo. In China, businesses can
continue to hide behind state ownership even if they are not profitable. No one loses face.
Where this is unavailable, such as in Japan’s capitalist market, then suicide is one way
out; for some it is preferable to using the new laws. Japan and other countries with a
strong culture of shame must find a way to balance economic goals, such as fueling the
economy through more and more credit, with the serious ramifications of overindebtedness. In the end, bankruptcy systems must be drafted to meet a country’s
cultural as well as economic needs. Merely transplanting bankruptcy systems from other
parts of the world, particularly culturally dissimilar places, is ineffective. The resulting
laws are misunderstood, distrusted and underutilized.
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VI. CONCLUSION
As the above discussion of U.S. policy demonstrates, the “fresh start,” as well as
the reorganization through a debtor-in-possession, grew from the ground up from the
roots of American capitalism.511 First came the creation of an entrepreneurial
economy,512 followed by an active consumer economy. The conditions for such a system
were present from the beginning of the economy and the bankruptcy systems grew
directly from them.
Today other countries are attempting to create more vibrant market-based
economies, in part by developing new insolvency systems.513 At the same time, citizens
of the world are also being exposed to more and more credit, often more than they can
back.514 One fairly obvious way to reduce the pain and suffering that could result from
this new credit economy is to enact lenient discharge and reorganization laws to address
the financial failure that will inevitably occur. This is certainly the global trend.515
This Article suggests that creating more forgiving insolvency systems may make
economic and social sense but still may not be accepted in some societies. On the other
hand, attitudes toward bankruptcy in the U.S. changed once bankruptcy became more
common, so perhaps long-held cultural views around the world will change as well. Only
time will tell. In the meantime, governments and lawmakers must realize that imported
bankruptcy systems are not being implanted onto blank cultural slates, such as the U.S.
economy and social system of the 1700’s and early 1800’s. Many existing cultures are far
more complicated. To those governments, I suggest the following cautious approach to
developing new insolvency systems.
First, recognizing that new bankruptcy systems take some time to be accepted,
governments and lawmakers should think very carefully and cautiously about how and
when to deregulate credit systems. They should try to limit available credit to that which
citizens can handle on their incomes, and try not to assume that extensive credit and
purchasing power necessarily represents the good life. For a society that does not accept
debt forgiveness, even if it is legally permissible, this could be a dangerous trap. The
social consequences could include losing the family home, other possessions, and even
family members themselves.
Second, assuming that it may be too late to carefully consider how credit is
regulated, because it already has been extended in amounts higher than many can pay,
governments and lawmakers should try to educate the public about responsible credit use,
as well as the debt forgiveness benefits that the law provides. Such education is being
attempted in bothEurope and Japan, although many consumers report that they are
511
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unaware of the debt forgiveness now allowed by law. Others still refuse to use these laws
because doing so is dishonorable.516 Education efforts should continue, in an effort to
destigmatize, as well as to avoid isolation, voluntary exile and suicide from overindebtedness.
Finally, governments that are working on new bankruptcy systems should avoid
the wholesale transplantation of any system, but in particular, should avoid transplanting
U.S. systems without giving thought to the individual components of such laws. U.S. debt
culture appears to be different from that of most of the rest of the world, and more
moderate approaches may transplant with greater success. Transplanted aspects of U.S.
bankruptcy law have been ignored in practice in Germany, Japan, Eastern Europe,
Indonesia,517 and Thailand,518as well as other parts of the world. They are simply too
confusing, contextual, and complicated to make sense in their new homes, and also are
based on social and cultural assumptions that the new host countries do not share.519 This
causes more problems than it solves by suggesting that the social problems caused by
over-indebtedness have been solved when they have not. Rather than importing any
systems wholesale, countries should attempt to borrow from many systems, and should
ensure that the new law reflects both the economic needs of the society, as well as the
unique cultural components of the society.520
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